

MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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THE LEGISLATURE

OF THE

STATE OF MAINE.

1863.

AUGUSTA:
STEVENS & SAYWARD, PRINTERS TO THE STATE.
1863.

FORTY-SECOND LEGISLATURE.

HOUSE.

No. 1.

To the Senate and House of Representatives:

I herewith transmit for your consideration, the report of John A. Poor, Commissioner appointed to confer with the United States Government in relation to the Defences of Maine.

ABNER COBURN.

COUNCIL CHAMBER, }
January 14, 1863. }

REPORT.

To His Excellency, HON. ISRAEL WASHBURN, JR.,
Governor of Maine:

SIR:—In the report submitted to you, under date of December 28th, 1861, by the Hon. Hannibal Hamlin, the late Hon. Reuel Williams, and myself, Commissioners appointed by you on the 23d of October, 1861, to confer with the authorities of the United States Government, as to the proper defences of the State of Maine, and the measures to be adopted to secure their construction and armament, by you submitted to the Legislature, and printed by their order, we gave you the results of the labors of the Commission to that date, with some suggestions, as to the policy of the Legislature, in view of the pledges made by the United States Government. Having performed this service, I asked leave to retire from further duty; but having received instructions from you to remain at Washington, in furtherance of the plans adopted by the State authorities, it is now my duty, under your instructions, to report the results since reached, in matters that came under my charge, or have since transpired toward the accomplishment of these objects.

Your long service in the public councils, occupying for ten consecutive years a seat in the United States House of Representatives, enables you to comprehend the difficulties in the way of full or of immediate success. You are also aware how many demands are made upon the time of the members of Congress above the ordinary duties of a representative, by the multiform applications of all sorts; calling on them to perform duties, which under other Governments, are discharged by an independent service, through Parliamentary lawyers and agents. One unacquainted with the practical labors of our Congressmen—with the vast constituences of the present day—can form but an inadequate idea of the fearful weight of drudgery which our system imposes on them. It was therefore a source of gratulation to our members, as I was assured,

that you thought proper to urge my remaining at Washington until the reports were obtained from the Engineer and Ordnance Bureaus, and from the War office upon the defences of Maine.

Through the unsolicited courtesy of the Hon. E. M. Stanton, Secretary of War, on his entrance upon office, tendering to me a card of admission to the War office at all hours, at the time that the pressure of duties, limited the admission of the public to a single day of the week, I was enabled to present to him, and the chiefs in his department, such facts, reasonings and arguments, as I was able, showing the military importance of Maine, and the proper means of her defence, as also to point out the inadequacy of all previous measures towards this object by the General Government. Your letter to the President, under date of October 23d, 1861, in response to the circular note of the Secretary of State of October 14, produced on his mind a decided and permanent impression. He studied its details with the aid of maps of that section of the country, and expressed his appreciation of its ability, and of the great value of the information in it, so pointedly set forth. The Secretary of War and the Chiefs of Engineers and of Ordnance shared this feeling, in common with the President; but the pressure of the routine of daily duties consequent on the rebellion, drew off attention to extraordinary matters, as they were pleased to call those set forth in your letter of October 23d; and I may venture to express the belief, that but for the presence of an agent in your service, following up in a constant round of visits the same officers then in charge, much greater delay would have occurred in the preparation of their reports upon the defences of Maine.

The frontier position of Maine, remote from the National Government, the few people of the State visiting the Capitol for the purpose of influencing public action, compared with the numbers from the Central States that throng all its avenues, and often absorb, if not monopolize with their own projects the time of the public officials, the habits of command thus acquired, by men of the larger and more central States, lead one to expect, as a matter of course, that the claims of a distant State, like Maine, will be undervalued, if not entirely overlooked and disregarded. Hence, through the force of this feeling, the moment the public mind was moved by the unfortunate affair of the Trent; upon the first whisper of danger of hostilities with England, the overwhelming and para-

mount claims of the city of New York threw aside the admitted demands of Maine; and those plans of defence, then in progress, which had been promised you, before the meeting of the Legislature, and in season to be laid before it on the 1st of January, 1862, were laid aside for the time.

It was in vain urged, in the midst of the exciting pressure, that the great point of danger in a collision with England was Maine. It availed little that a large combined fleet of England and France had occupied the harbor of Halifax from early spring, in 1861, till then, waiting for an occasion or an excuse, to enter and hold Portland harbor, then almost entirely defenceless. It was difficult, too, to gain audience to point out to the Administration the consequences which must result from such a loss to the United States as that of the Territory, lying east of the line of Railway from Portland to the Canadian frontier, on the line to Montreal. We could point to the fact that two millions had been expended already for the defence of Boston harbor; over a million and a half for the defence of Newport, Rhode Island; and over three and a half millions for the defence of New York City; neither of which, in a military point of view, it was admitted, is so important as the harbor of Portland, at which, to the end of the fiscal year 1860, only the pitiful sum of \$283,553.34 had been expended since the organization of the Federal government in 1789. Portsmouth Navy yard, so called, at Kittery, was almost entirely undefended.

To show that the complaints of Maine were not unreasonable, the following statement, compiled from official sources, was submitted, showing the expenditures for fortifications, in the United States, from the foundation of the United States Government in 1789, to the close of the fiscal year 1860, as follows, viz:

Expenditures for Fortifications.

Maine,	706,849 26
New Hampshire,	41,254 97
Massachusetts,	2,035,419 29
Rhode Island,	1,726,650 60
Connecticut,	249,411 66
New York,	4,119,581 54
Pennsylvania,	86,028 03
Delaware,	2,134,466 00
Maryland,	1,563,291 91

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Virginia,	.	.	.	4,365,506	16
North Carolina,	.	.	.	1,045,801	41
South Carolina,	.	.	.	1,273,391	67
Georgia,	.	.	.	1,130,937	99
Florida,	.	.	.	4,560,410	25
Alabama,	.	.	.	1,516,940	76
Mississippi,	.	.	.	104,000	00
Louisiana,	.	.	.	2,689,823	18
Texas,	.	.	.	26,806	35
Michigan,	.	.	.	176,268	50
California,	.	.	.	2,574,709	35

Of the above sum of \$706,849.26 expended for fortifications in Maine, the amounts applied to particular works were as follows :

For Fort Preble,	.	.	.	56,248	57
“ Scammel,	.	.	.	67,303	77
“ Gorges,	.	.	.	160,000	00
“ Knox,	.	.	.	422,067	92
“ Popham,	.	.	.	1,000	00
Repairs on Fortifications,	.	.	.	229	00

Of the \$41,254.97 expended in New Hampshire, \$22,563.17 was on Fort McClary, \$18,492 80 on Fort Constitution, and \$199 00 on repairs.

Expenditures for Fortifications, depend on geographical laws, and not on political boundaries ; and in the several States, necessarily bear no proportion to the population or importance of a State, in federal numbers, but upon the inherent value of its position for military and naval purposes. It might be supposed, that a Territory like Maine, having an exposed frontage upon the Ocean with many hundred miles of undefended sea coast, indented with innumerable harbors ; penetrated by deep rivers, carrying navigable waters with every flow of the tide, far into the interior, rendering the country completely exposed to the incursions of an enemy, and in case of hostilities affording ample shelter to a foe, bordering on three sides upon the dominions of a foreign power, and that power the only one thought of in view of our necessities for defence ; would have been the object of attention by the general Government. And when too, the geographical position of this same Territory, is admitted to be of vital importance to the commercial and political interests of the country, the possession of

which has been a chief cause of war upon this continent, it was right to infer, that it would have had a reasonable claim for defence upon the Federal Government, at a time that a general system of defences was in progress.

In case of a war with England, Maine would be the first point of attack, and it is difficult to perceive any good reason for fortifying the Capes of the Delaware, or the mouths of the Mississippi and the Savannah Rivers, while the Penobscot and Kennebec are undefended.

If Pensacola and Norfolk Navy Yards required the armament of their outlying forts, the same necessity called for the defence of Portsmouth Navy Yard at Kittery.

No one could object to large expenditures in the less important States, if corresponding advantages are thereby secured.

The expenditure in the little State of Delaware of three times the amount paid out for fortifications in Maine, can perhaps be justified because the defences of the city of Philadelphia are necessarily located in the State of Delaware; and the great work for the defence of Narragansett Bay, is placed in the State of Rhode Island, though equally important for the defence of harbors in Massachusetts.

It may be of interest in this connection, to submit the following table, showing the amounts expended for public works, by the National Government, from 1789 to the close of the year fiscal, 1860, in the several States, June 30, 1860 :

Maine,	\$2,680,243 59
New Hampshire,	2,372,058 11
Vermont,	413,449 57
Massachusetts,	11,026,625 34
Rhode Island,	2,176,082 39
Connecticut,	898,843 25
New York,	17,366,240 88
New Jersey,	684,184 74
Pennsylvania,	4,140,330 43
Pennsylvania and Delaware,	38,143 00
Delaware,	3,852,341 78
Maryland,	3,444,464 63
Virginia,	12,820,990 52
North Carolina,	2,483,853 60
South Carolina,	3,782,630 40

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Georgia,	2,213,426	86
Florida,	10,372,185	63
Alabama,	2,581,398	52
Mississippi,	354,388	51
Louisiana,	8,973,875	68
Texas,	241,031	77
Arkansas,	353,611	22
Missouri,	953,717	57
Kentucky,	388,589	23
Kentucky and Tennessee,	135,000	00
Tennessee,	70,616	02
Ohio,	1,651,783	78
Indiana,	351,567	46
Illinois,	961,728	78
Michigan,	1,470,557	30
Wisconsin,	421,513	14
Iowa,	499,817	04
Minnesota,	110,561	18
Kansas,	55,744	84
California,	7,854,659	55
Oregon,	118,624	31
Territory of Nebraska,	49,996	34
Territory of New Mexico,	91,798	53
Utah Territory,	64,998	90
Washington Territory,	164,041	73
Expenditures for Improvements of the Western Rivers chargeable to the States through which the rivers pass,	2,068,000	00
	<u>\$111,773,986</u>	12

The Expenditures in the District of Columbia, are not included in the above statement.

From this statement, it appears that one half of the expenditures for permanent works in the country, and that of the \$34,257,754.88 expended for fortifications 22,541,374.68, were absorbed by the slave States, and only \$11,716,173.20 were expended in the free States, upon fortifications.

To this, should be added the appropriations to several of the States of portions of the public lands therein situated, for public uses, amounting to the number of acres, and to the sums set forth

in the following table, estimating for the value of the lands at the minimum price of \$1.25 per acre :

States.	Acres.	Value.
Ohio,	1,297,439	\$1,621,798.75
Indiana,	2,947,153	3,683,941.25
Illinois,	6,357,467	7,946,833.75
Missouri,	6,727,489	8,409,361.25
Alabama,	2,837,133	3,546,416.25
Mississippi,	5,259,455	6,574,318.75
Louisiana,	12,912,663	16,140,828.75
Michigan,	11,632,924	14,541,155.00
Arkansas,	10,628,011	13,285,013.75
Florida,	14,111,277	17,639,096.25
Iowa,	6,050,400	7,563,000.00
Wisconsin,	6,262,707	7,828,383.75
California,	506,400	633,000.00
Oregon,	506,400	633,000.00
Minnesota,	4,522,400	5,653,000.00
Total,	92,559,318	\$115,699,147.50

Of the 92,559,318 acres, as above granted, 60,108,952 acres were donated to Slave States, and 32,450,366 acres to Free States.

On the 23d of December, 1861, Gen. Ripley, chief of ordnance, gave me the following statement of the guns and gun carriages which had been assigned to Maine, viz :

FORT.	KINDS OF GUN AND CARRIAGE.	ARSENAL WHENCE DRAWN.
Fort Knox,	16 32-pounder Barbette Carriages,	Washington.
	Guns for the above,	New York.
	15 32-pounder Barbette Carriages,	Alleghany.
	Guns for the same,	Fort Monroe.
	20 24-pounder Barbette Carriages,	Alleghany.
	Guns for the same,	Washington.
	5 8-inch S. C. Howitzer Carriages,	Watervliet.
	Guns for the same,	New York.
	12 24-pounder Howitzer Carriages, F. D.	Fort Monroe.
	8 24-pounder Howitzers,	Do.
4 24 " " "	Watertown.	
Fort Scammell,	10 32-pounder Barbette Carriages,	Alleghany.
	Guns for the same,	New York.
	4 24-pounder Barbette Carriages,	Watervliet.
	Guns for the same,	Fort Monroe.
	4 8-inch S. C. Howitzer Carriages,	Watervliet.
Guns for the same,	New York.	

Subsequently, Captain T. J. Rodman, captain of ordnance, in charge of Watertown Arsenal, gave me a list of guns and gun carriages shipped to Maine, as follows, viz :

“ Twenty-two rifled 32-pounders have been ordered shipped from Fort Monroe.

“ Three 24 and fifteen 42-pounders have been or are to be shipped from Boston, all rifled.

“ Also nine 24-pounders, smooth bore, from Boston, all to Portland harbor, Maine, together with carriages for the whole number of guns.”

The shipment of these guns was hastened by the urgency of your letter of December 16th and 17th, 1861, referred to in our report of December 28th, 1861; information having been given by me, to the ordnance office, of the means of shipment from Fortress Monroe.

In our report, submitted to you under date of December 28th, 1861, it was stated that a commission was then in session to determine the character of ordnance, hereafter used in the permanent fortifications of the country. On the close of its labors, a report from Gen. Totten, on the defences of Maine, was submitted to the Secretary of War; but it was not fully completed, with its estimates from the Ordnance Bureau, till the 31st day of January, 1862, when a copy was submitted to the members of Congress, and was taken by leave of the Secretary of War, by me, for your inspection, which was as follows :

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, *Jan. 4, 1862.*

HON. SIMON CAMERON, *Secretary of War:*

SIR:—In conformity with the tenor of your letter of the 16th November, addressed to His Excellency, the Governor of the State of Maine, on the subject of defences required within the limits of that State, I have the honor to offer the following statement of the present condition of the defences, with some remarks on such further defensive works as seem to me within the scope of the contemplated preparation.

Up to this time, since the peace of 1815, labors upon fortifications have been confined (within the State of Maine) to the harbors of *Portsmouth*, of which the eastern shores are in that State; of *Portland*, and to the *Narrows of the Penobscot*.

Projects have been made and sanctioned by Congress, for the *defence of the mouth of the Kennebec*; steps taken to secure a title to this site, and all preliminary means that are practicable, will be taken during the winter for the early commencement and rapid prosecution of the work next year.

The places mentioned have heretofore been regarded as points of the greatest importance on that coast, and requiring first to be put in a state of security.

There are other interests of consequence; several growing and

quite populous towns, for instance, which, in a war with a naval power, would be exposed to predatory visits from privateers and small cruisers ; but as these as yet would hardly invite formidable enterprises, adequate protection, in the way of temporary seacoast batteries, may be promptly provided whenever the danger shall seem to immediately impend.

These do not, however, compare as to importance or exposure to the points named above, where two great rivers, one harbor enclosing a large city, with the termini of several railroads, with corresponding external commerce, and one embracing, besides a large town and its commerce, one of the greatest navy yards of the nations, demand protection of the surest kind.

Should a state of war expose the others to depredations from small enterprises, resort must be had, for some time to come at any rate, to batteries of earth, to be thrown up and served by the local or neighboring military force.

For the armament of such batteries, there should be provided in good time, and placed at hand, or conveniently for speedy distribution, a full supply of ordnance and ordnance stores.

I will now turn to particulars of the important points before mentioned, taking them up in order, beginning with the most southern.

Portsmouth Harbor.—Navy Yard.

These have no other land defences than *Fort Constitution*, on Gt. Island, (N. H.,) and *Fort McClary*, on the Kittery (Maine) shore. Both were erected a little before the war of 1812. They occupy important points imperfectly, and are quite inadequate to a proper defence of the entrance of the harbor.

But, in the want of better, they have been put in the best condition possible, as regards efficiency against a naval attack, and are now in readiness to receive their full armament, namely :

Old *Fort Constitution*, 46 guns bearing upon the channel, which are to be of the largest calibre, viz. :

3 15-inch guns,
30 10 and 8-inch guns,
13 32 and 24-pounders.

—
46

Besides 12 mortars and field guns.

—
Total, 58 pieces.

New *Fort Constitution*, designed to occupy the site of the present fort, will be calculated for—

3 15-inch guns,
81 10 “ “
37 8 “ “
12 32-pounders,
4 24-pound howitzers,
12 mortars and field guns.

—
Total, 149 pieces.

The actual armament of *Fort Constitution* is—

1 32-pounder,
20 24 “ “
4 field pieces.

—
Total, 25 pieces.

Old *Fort McClary* (Kittery) should have for its armament—

1 15-inch gun,
8 8 “ “
4 block house howitzers,
6 mortars and field guns.

—
Total, 19 pieces.

New *Fort McClary*, designed to occupy the same site, will be calculated for—

6 15-inch guns,
11 10 “ “
28 8 “ “
8 32-pounders,
6 mortars, field pieces, &c.

—
Total, 59 pieces.

The actual armament is—

4 32-pounders.

The new forts mentioned above, or rather the projected forts, will be commenced as soon as may be ; but as such works cannot very speedily be got ready to receive guns, it will be indispensable, if a war is deemed to be at hand, with a naval power, to add to the present forts, by constructing temporary earthen batteries upon commanding positions, to be armed with numerous pieces of the heaviest calibres.

The new forts mentioned may be well advanced and prepared to receive considerable more than the proper armament of the old ones before it will be necessary to break up the latter. In the meantime, the full armament of both old and new should be made ready, mounting in temporary works the overplus beyond what the permanent works may be ready for.

From the above statement it is obvious :

First, that the matter of supplying large guns to the existing batteries of Portsmouth harbor is of pressing necessity.

Secondly, that a large reserve of such guns, amounting, with those now present and the proper armament of the old forts, to all that will be needed for the new forts, should be in readiness to be placed in temporary batteries, if such be called for.

Thirdly, that positions for temporary batteries be forthwith selected, by examination of the ground, and such plans thereof made as will permit them to be properly laid and promptly built.

Such examinations have been ordered ; and the extent of batteries that shall thereon be deemed necessary, with others required for other parts of the State, will be reported as soon as determined.

Fourthly. In the probable absence of regular troops, reliance must be had on local force, to man the works, permanent and temporary, in this harbor.

To which end there should be a particular organization of the local military force, including a simple system of drill and practical instruction, with rigid rules as to accountability.

The extent of this force in numbers for each distinct battery or fort, may be estimated, at a maximum, at ten men per gun, inclusive of non-commissioned officers.

Fifthly. And at the earliest day practicable, in the coming year, the permanent fortifications, already planned, should be commenced, to be pressed forward with all the rapidity consistent with a judicious expenditure.

Portland Harbor.

The harbor of Portland comes next, proceeding northward.

Fort Preble and *Fort Scammell*, the only forts here that are in readiness for service, were constructed before the war of 1812. As in Portsmouth harbor, all that could well be added to the strength of the old forts has been applied.

Old Fort Preble originally held but 11 or 12 guns; it is now ready for 36 guns, viz :

1 15-inch gun,
34 10 " guns,
and 1 24-pounder.

—
36

besides 10 mortar and field guns.

—
Total, 46 pieces.

Its present armament is—

1 8-inch seacoast howitzer,
and 12 24-pounders.

—
13 guns.

New Fort Preble was projected many years ago, and will be commenced, it is hoped, at an early day.

Its armament will be—

2 15-inch guns,
20 10 " "
22 8 " "
10 32-pounders,
8 24-pounder howitzers,
10 field guns and mortars.

—
Total, 72 pieces.

Fort Scammell, at first planned for 9 guns, is now fitted for 71 guns, namely :

1	15-inch gun,
38	10 " guns,
18	32-pounders,
7	12-pounder block house guns.

64

Besides 7 mortars and field pieces.

Total, 71 pieces.

No portion of the armament is now in place.

A fort now under construction on Hog Island ledge, called *Fort Gorges*, may now be made to receive 12 8-inch casemate guns ; and by the end of the next working season the full armament of its two lower tiers, namely, 56 8 and 10-inch guns.

Were all the armament just specified in the places prepared for them, there would be 195 15-inch, 10-inch, and 8-inch calibres, including some 32-pounders bearing from the most advantageous positions upon the harbor and its entrance, and with the intended progress at *Fort Gorges*, there will be 149 of such guns by the end of next summer, omitting field guns, mortars, and block house guns.

On the completion of *Fort Gorges*, the total number of pieces will be 218, and on the completion of new *Fort Preble*, 290.

This is a formidable array of artillery, but it is not all that may be advantageously opposed to an enemy, provided additional guns with all necessary appurtenances can be furnished in measure, as temporary places are made ready for them.

I assume that 150 guns in addition to those the forts will receive, (omitting new *Fort Preble*) may be judiciously disposed of in that way, which will raise the total for Portland harbor to 368 pieces. Of this number, new *Fort Preble* will receive, when finished, 72.

In anticipation of such further provisions of heavy batteries, instructions have been given to Capt. Casey, the engineer officer in charge at Portland, to make particular examination of the outer islands of the harbor, viz : Bangs, Peaks, Great Hog Islands, &c., report as to the necessity of occupying with temporary batteries, or any or all of them, and in that case, stating the number of guns, and giving plans and estimates of the cost of such necessary batteries.

These instructions directed, moreover, similar examinations and report, as to the necessity of placing batteries upon *Fish Point*, and of erecting field works on the grounds to the West, South and Southeast of the harbor and town.

The situation of *Fish Point* is such that a large number of guns may be mounted there in temporary batteries in most advantageous positions for action upon the harbor.

The necessity for a particular organization and arrangement of the force, militia and volunteers, with a view to the occupation and service of these batteries, in the absence of regular troops, is at

least as obvious here as at Portsmouth, before mentioned. That, indeed, would seem to me the most necessary step of all, in preparation for an enemy.

All the forts and batteries necessary must be in readiness as soon as possible.

These must also, in due time, have their full complement of ordnance of all kinds. But all this preparation will be useless—if not constituting an actual danger—unless the forts and guns are properly guarded, manned and served.

The particular matter of the earliest practicable detail and assignment of State troops to the several forts and batteries, and the diligent exercise of the guns, with liberal target practice, is earnestly pressed upon the authorities.

It should always be understood, as to important places like Portsmouth and Portland in particular, that in addition to such permanent defences as can find good positions; even when all these are ready there should be brought into action floating defences to the full extent that the neighboring resources can supply.

Much more will these be needed so long as the system of fortifications for the places is incomplete, and therefore under any probability that a contest with a powerful naval adversary is pending, all reinforcements of that system that can be afforded in the way of *floating batteries*, naval rams, &c., &c., should be prepared and put in position.

It may not be out of place to enlarge a little here on the necessity and mode of application of the aid to be derived from the interior strength of the State.

Mention is made above of the outer inlands of the harbor, Bangs, Peaks, Hog Island, &c., as possibly entering into the system of defence. The idea is, that war vessels lying under their high shores would be screened from the harbor forts, while still able with long range guns to throw their missiles into the city and among the shipping, or that they might even land guns for that purpose upon those islands or some one of them. This being possible, the precaution against both modes of attack is, to place thereon field works of strength to resist escalade, and armed with guns enough to keep the enemy at a distance.

These are things not difficult to do, nor to do promptly, as regards the field fortifications. It is quite plain that we must take care that these works shall not be taken from us, to be used against us. The field works will make the island defensible with adequate troops, but not without troops, nor even with feeble garrisons. Both strong field works, and strong garrisons, will be indispensable.

But the town itself is exposed to a danger of the same nature if a heavy expedition be sent against it. This might be strong enough to land forces to the south of the harbor, that is on the shore to the south of Portland Head Light, or a little westward of Cape Elizabeth, less than six miles off, and planting some long range guns on the ridge overlooking the harbor on the south, exact a contribution, or fire upon the town and shipping. One or

two redoubts erected on the ridge at the beginning of a war should prevent this.

Or the enemy might be in sufficient force to hold the surrounding country for a short time, in which case, the complete protection of the town would require a line of from seven to ten such redoubts, extending from the ridge just mentioned (inclusive) round to the north shore of Back Cove.

With this provision of land defences that could be got ready in a short time, together with those proposed above for the islands, and the permanent harbor fortifications, the town and harbor would be safe; it being understood that all the suggested arrangements for drawing succor from the interior of the country are complete.

The numerous railroads concentrating at Portland add greatly to its security, because, permitting all New England and even a portion of the State of New York to send contributions of volunteers within a very brief period; so brief that only an enemy in a very great force would venture on an entire investiture of the town.

Mouth of the Kennebec River,

The next point eastward of Portland which the Government has designed to protect.

For this, plans have been made, and measures likely soon to be complete, are in hand for perfecting the title to the land needed in addition to that now owned by the United States, as the site of an old fort on Hunnewell's Point.

The labors on the new fort will commence as soon as possible in the spring, in the meantime, as much will be done in preparations as winter weather will allow.

This fort, which will be pressed forward in execution, occupying an admirable position to control the channel of the river, will, when finished, be armed as follows:

26	10-inch guns,
36	8 " " "
4	24 pound howitzers.
—	
66	
9	mortars and field pieces.
—	

Total, 75 pieces.

At least half of the above number of guns (say 40 pieces) should be deposited at some convenient place in order to being mounted in temporary batteries, if required, before the completion of the fort.

Narrows of the Penobscot.

The position eastward, next to be mentioned, is at the narrows of the Penobscot, where Fort Knox is situated.

This is still in progress, but has now and has had for a number of years, preparations for a large number of guns bearing advantageously on the channel, namely, 55 of 10 and 8 inch calibres.

The works will be pressed forward industriously, and may be ready, to a considerable extent next year, soon for all its armament, as follows :

1	15-inch	gun,
13	10	guns,
86	8	“ “
14	32 and 24-	pounders,
20	flank howitzers,	
16	mortars and field pieces.	

Making 150 pieces.

In the first portions of this letter it was particularly noticed that it had been impossible to undertake the defence by permanent works of any other points on the coast of Maine than those that have now been herein specified, these being what may be designated from their relative value the great points of the coast.

Under any danger that may suddenly or soon threaten other places—among which are many of much local importance—there cannot be, for a considerable time, any other protection of this nature than such as may be quickly erected. This, however, may be enough, considering the force and energy that will be brought into action, provided there be at hand, ready for use, a liberal supply of heavy guns.

It is unnecessary for me to specify points where this provision should be made : indeed, from imperfect local knowledge as to parts of the coast of Maine, I should, no doubt, unduly magnify some position, and perhaps altogether omit others quite important.

Thus, I might name Eastport, Machias, Castine, Wiscasset, etc., as points where the batteries formerly erected should be repaired, and perhaps enlarged, but if limited to these, enumeration would probably be partial and unjust, and I do not know how far to extend it.

On this subject, I beg to add, as the best advice I can give, that there should be at every harbor of importance enough to invite an attack, a deposit of from two to ten guns, (according to importance and exposure,) with every equipment and supply, all properly housed, and put under due accountability, it being made a part of the military training of the local volunteers, to keep these guns in perfect order, and to handle them, and exercise with them diligently, including liberal target practice.

To those who are well acquainted with the coast should be left the determination of the relative importance of these places, and the assignment of their armament.

I may now close this letter with a recapitulation of the ordnance needed, according to the within statements, for the defence of the coast of Maine, including the harbor of Portsmouth.

For the purpose of approaching the grand total of the armament for the whole coast of the State, I will suppose that there are, besides the points herein provided for, ten ports or harbors needing the protection of batteries, and that these will require an average of five pieces each, making fifty in all ; say,

DEFENCES OF MAINE.

17

13 10-inch guns,
 12 8 " "
 13 32-pounders,
 12 24 " "

Total, 50 pieces

Before adding the table of totals, I will make the remark that rifled cannon are not mentioned therein, because none have yet been adopted amongst the large calibres. Experiments will soon probably decide as to the best, and then in certain places, they will be substituted for the guns now specified.

Recapitulation of number of guns required to be mounted for the defence of the coast of Maine.

PLACE.	15-inch.	10-inch.	8-inch.	32-pounders.	24-pounders.	24-pound howitzers.	12-pound boat howitzers.	Mortars and field pieces.	Total, including only guns above 24-pounders.	Grand total.
Portsmouth harbor	6	90	58	21	4	4	4	24	175	211
Portland harbor	6	163	112	44	1	8	7	27	325	368
Mouth Kennebec river		26	36			4		9	62	75
Narrows of Penobscot	1	13	86	7	7	20		16	107	150
Other harbors of the State		13	12	13	12				38	50
Totals	13	305	304	85	24	36	11	76	707	854

I am, very respectfully,
 Your obedient servant,
 JOS. G. TOTTEN,
Bt. Brig. Gen., and Colonel of Engineers.

ENGINEER DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, Jan. 18, 1862.

THOMAS A. SCOTT, Esq., *Assistant Secretary of War :*

SIR:—In compliance with your letter of the 10th inst., which illness has, until now delayed, I have the honor to present the following estimate of the amount required, to carry out the arrangements proposed in my report of the 4th inst., for the defence of the coast of Maine.

You will please bear in mind that the cost of fortification, (permanent and temporary,) only is included. The armaments, and what pertains thereto, namely, gun carriages, ammunition, &c., &c., I am not able to estimate for.

Portsmouth Harbor.

For the commencement of the new forts Constitution and McClary, to be applied during the year to pushing forward these permanent works,	\$200,000
Should there be a war with a maritime power threatened within the year, there will be needed for temporary batteries, and to strengthen the old forts, the further sum of, say	150,000
	<hr/> \$350,000 <hr/>

Portland Harbor.

For the commencement of new Fort Preble,	\$75,000
“ continuation of works at Fort Scammell	75,000
“ “ “ Fort Gorges,	150,000
“ the erection of temporary works on the islands and shores of the harbor in case a war be deemed probable,	200,000
	<hr/> \$500,000 <hr/>

Mouth of the Kennebec River.

There is now an appropriation for a permanent work at the mouth on Hunnewell's Point, but an approaching war would necessitate the erection of temporary works, to offer any resistance within the year; the requisite works may be estimated to cost,	\$50,000
	<hr/> \$900,000 <hr/>

Narrows of the Penobscot River.

For the continuation of work on Fort Knox,	\$150,000
As the full efficiency of these batteries cannot be obtained before the close of the year, it may be, on the suppositions before made, necessary to expend in this vicinity, in addition, say	50,000
	<hr/> \$200,000 <hr/>

Assuming now, for want of precise information as in my report of the 4th inst., that there may be needed, on the approach of war, temporary batteries at as many as ten places along the coast, besides those specified above, each mounting on the average, five pieces, making fifty in all; we may estimate that their cost will be covered by the sum of	100,000
	<hr/>

Total,	<hr/> \$1,200,000 <hr/>
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DEFENCES OF MAINE.

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We thus obtain a sum, unavoidably, in some respects, the result of rather crude guess work, applicable to fortifications on the coast of Maine, (including Portsmouth harbor,) within the year, in case a war be regarded as impending, amounting as above, in all, to \$1,200,000

Of this sum a portion is included in the estimates now before Congress, being 300,000

Leaving to be otherwise provided, 900,000

Again, of this whole sum of \$1,200,000 a considerable portion is designed for permanent works namely, 650,000

Leaving to be applied to temporary works, and therefore to be called for only on the approach of war, of the sum of 550,000

Once more, if the sum estimated for permanent works is 650,000

The estimate now before Congress will cover, if confirmed, the sum of 300,000

Leaving as all that will be required in addition, if peace is not likely to be disturbed within the year, the sum of 350,000

I am respectfully, your ob't serv't,

JOS. G. TOTTEN,

Bt. Brig. Gen., and Colonel of Engineers.

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Estimate of the funds required for the Armament of the Forts on the Coast of Maine, including guns, gun-carriages, implements and equipments, ammunition, &c.:

13 15-inch gun,	\$78,000 00	
13 15-inch carriages, implements, and equipments,	26,715 00	
1,300 rounds of 15-inch ammunition,	33,525 00	
	138,240 00	
305 10-inch guns,	358,253 00	
305 10-inch carriages, implements, and equipments,	243,390 00	
30,500 rounds of 10-inch ammunition,	289,364 00	
	891,007 00	
303 8-inch guns,	200,061 81	
303 8-inch carriages, implements, and equipments,	225,755 00	
303,000 rounds 8-inch ammunition,	179,460 00	
	605,256 81	
80 32-pound guns,	44,928 00	
80 32-pound carriages, implements, and equipments,	30,400 00	
8,000 rounds of 32-pound ammunition,	35,952 50	
	111,280 50	
24 24-pound guns (in position),		
2,400 rounds of 24-pound ammunition,		7,154 00
36 24-pound howitzers, for flank defence,	4,144 22	
36 24-pound carriages, implements, and equipments	8,108 00	
3,600 rounds 24-pound ammunition,	7,848 00	
	20,100 22	
11 12-pound howitzers, for block houses,	3,987 28	
11 12-pound carriages, implements, and equipments,	2,420 00	
1,100 rounds of 12-pound ammunition,	1,210 00	
	7,607 28	

10 13-inch mortars, sea coast,	11,128 00	
10 13-inch mortar beds, &c., &c.,	5,605 00	
10 13-inch mortar platforms,	1,500 00	
1,000 rounds of ammunition,	14,350 00	
	<hr/>	32,583 00
18 10-inch mortar, siege,	2,223 00	
18 10-inch mortar beds, &c., &c.,	2,700 00	
18 10-inch mortar platforms,	900 00	
1,800 rounds of ammunition,	13,700 00	
	<hr/>	19,523 00
12 8-inch mortars, siege,	787 00	
12 8-inch mortar beds, &c., &c.,	2,000 00	
12 8-inch mortar platforms,	600 00	
1,200 rounds of ammunition,	4,800 00	
	<hr/>	8,287 00
36 field guns,	14,109 12	
36 field carriages,	15,434 28	
3,600 rounds of ammunition,	3,360 00	
	<hr/>	32,903 40
7 Casement gins,		910 00
7 Rampart gins,		910 00
7 Casement trucks,		630 00
7 Sling carts, heavy,		1,925 00
7 Sling carts, light,		1,050 00
14 Hand carts,		420 00
		<hr/>
Total,		\$1,879,797 21

WATERTOWN ARSENAL, January 28, 1862.

T. J. RODMAN, *Capt., Ord.*

At the time this report was submitted the fortification bill was pending before Congress in which was contained the following appropriations for the year 1862 and 1863 :

For Fort Knox,	\$150,000
Fort Gorges,	150,000

There was also an available unexpended appropriation of \$100,000 for Fort Popham, spoken of in our former report. Realizing the inadequacy of the recommendations of the Chief of Engineers to meet the just expectations of the authorities of Maine upon the pledges previously given, I asked and obtained leave of the Secretary of War, to address him a note in your behalf, on the subject of the defences of Maine, which I had the honor to submit to him, informally on the 15th of February, and in a printed form on the 17th of February, with other papers. This letter was as follows :

Defences of Maine.

Washington, January 31, 1862.

To the Hon. Edward M. Stanton, Secretary of War :

SIR :—Having examined the several reports of Gen. Totten upon the defences of Maine, under dates of Nov. 23d, 1861, of Jan. 4th, 1862, and Jan. 18, 1862—submitted in accordance with the tenor

of the letter addressed by the Secretary of War to the Governor of Maine, of Nov. 16—with estimates of the cost of armament, this day submitted by Gen. Ripley; the undersigned, in behalf of his Excellency the Governor of Maine, begs leave most respectfully to submit some observations thereon, and to ask leave to offer a bill for your approval, to carry into effect the measures of defence proposed, in the letter of the Governor of Maine to the President.

The memoir or letter of Governor Washburn to the President, under date of October 23, 1861, in reply to the official note of the Secretary of State, of the 14th of October, calling the attention of the President to the peculiarly exposed situation of Maine, and pointing out, to some extent, the character of the works deemed indispensable to the protection of the State and of the United States, was promptly referred by the President to the Secretary of War, and by him submitted to the Chiefs of the Bureaus of Engineers and Ordnance, with instructions to report promptly and fully thereon. The reports of Gen. Totten, under dates of November 23d, January 4th, and January 18th, in reply thereto—to which I invite careful attention—are devoted, principally, to estimates of the cost of construction and equipment of certain forts, already authorized by Congress, at the places following, viz :

Portsmouth Navy Yard, at Kittery, Maine ;
Portland Harbor ;
The Mouth of the Kennebec River ;
The Narrows of the Penobscot River :

These estimates, it would seem, are confined to the expenditures that can be advantageously made within the year, without setting forth the extent of expenditure required, to complete and perfect them, as permanent works of defence.

The possible necessity of erecting additional earth-works of a temporary character, is suggested, at the places named and at ten other different points or places in the State, in case of threatened war, but no designation of the other places is made. The number of places pointed out, as probably requiring defensive works, is less than those heretofore recommended by the War Department in 1851.

In the report of the Hon. Charles M. Conrad, Secretary of War, with its accompanying report of Gen. Totten, Ex. Doc., No. 5, 32d Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives, vol. 3, Ex. Doc., 1851-'52, fortifications were recommended at the places mentioned in the following table, and the cost of construction and armament given, as follows, viz :

	Estimated cost of construction.	Estimated cost of armament.
Eastport Harbor,	\$100,000	\$32,000
Machias Harbor,	100,000	44,500
Mount Desert Island,	500,000	178,000
Castine,	50,000	22,280

St. George's River,	}	400,000	178,000
Damariscotta,			
Broad Bay, (Waldoboro',)			
Sheepscott River,			
Saco,	}	75,000	26,700
Kennebunk,			
York,			

If these works were called for, then, on the basis of the peace establishment, for the protection of those important commercial ports, they are surely called for now, as these places are still without any sign of defence. Rockland and Belfast, both flourishing sea-ports, the smallest of which owns more tons of ships than the city of Savannah, Georgia, were specially pointed out in the communication of the Governor, as deserving attention. They are both capable of being defended at a moderate expense.

But what is a most serious cause of regret, is, that the report of Gen. Totten, makes not the slightest allusion to the important matter of the frontier defences of Maine, along a line of boundary, bordering for hundreds of miles on British territory, and makes no allusion to the use of railways as a means of defence and attack, except in that paragraph of his report, where he says that "the various railroads, concentrating at Portland add greatly to its security," affording means for the prompt concentration of troops and supplies from other States. But the fact ought not to be overlooked, that the only line of railway extending west from Portland to the line of New Hampshire, runs near to the sea-board, where an enemy, by seizing on York, Kennebunk or Saco, could cut off entirely all communication by railway, between Maine and the other States of the Union. If railways are to be relied on, for the defence of Portland, an interior line should be completed or the sea-port towns fortified, between Portland and the South Berwick Junction.

But the great omission in Gen. Totten's report, to which I would call attention, is the entire disregard of all that portion of the communication of the Governor, that urges the construction of a military road in the form of a railway from the city of Bangor to the northern boundary of Maine. This point was strenuously urged by the Governor, in his letter of October 23d, to the President, and it must naturally arise to the mind of every military officer, properly familiar with the uses and working of railways, as a means of defence and attack, in the event of war; and so important did he deem this matter, that in his annual message to the legislature of Maine, under date of Jan. 2d, he called attention thereto in the following language:

"Upon the coast of Maine are more deep accessible harbors, capable of being entered by ships of war of the largest class, than can be found on the entire coast line of the Slaveholding States; and yet, since she became a member of the Federal Union, in 1820, and although she was at that time substantially destitute of fortifications, the appropriations by the Federal Government for her coast protection, have been less than half the amount that was expended within ten years for the building of a Custom House in the city of Charleston.

“For more than four hundred miles this State is separated from the British Provinces of New Brunswick and Canada by a merely imaginary line. Of the deep and bitter hostility to this country of large numbers of the people of these Provinces, we have now, unhappily, the most indubitable proofs. In view of the present attitude of the British Nation towards the United States, and of the feeling of the British people towards our own, the fact will not escape attention that while the defences of our State upon the sea board have been so strangely neglected, and not a dollar has been expended for her protection on her extended interior boundary, her best means of defence by land has been taken from her by the United States, and ceded to the only power in whose possession it could be available to her injury; nor shall we fail to be reminded of the memorable declaration of one of her most distinguished Chief Magistrates—of him who was the soul of all that is noble and chivalrous in human character, and whose exceeding love for the State which he served so faithfully, will keep his memory forever green in the hearts of her sons—“Maine,” said Enoch Lincoln, “has not been treated as she has endeavored to deserve.”

“How unwise was the provision of the treaty of Washington, by which the United States surrendered to Great Britain that portion of the State of Maine north of the river St. John, without the possession of which she was shut out from Canada one half of the year, may now be seen not only in the fact that thereby we opened a way for the transportation, in the winter, of the very troops upon which, in the event of hostilities between the two nations breaking out at that season of the year, she must largely rely, whether for defence or attack, but also in the menacing spirit, encouraged by that capitulation, in which she now takes occasion to address us.

“As the question of the extent and character of the works required by the exigencies of our situation, has been considered at some length in the communication which I had the honor to address to the President of the United States, on the twenty-third of last October, and which will be before you, I will not now occupy your time upon the subject farther, than to suggest that the cost of the necessary fortifications at the exposed points—at Eastport, Castine, Rockland, Belfast, Wiscasset, the mouth of the Kennebec, Saco River and other places—will be largely reduced, if we can find at some central eligible point, within what may be termed supporting distance, the indispensable conditions of a great and impregnable fortress, from which all needful succor, by sea or land, may be speedily forwarded.

“To those of you who are acquainted with the position of the city of Portland, the configuration of the country surrounding it, the capacity and natural defences of its wonderful harbor, and its extensive railway connections, its admirable adaptability to the purpose I have mentioned will need no elucidation. Its natural capabilities are such that, at a comparatively small expense, it may be made *absolutely impregnable*. From Eastport to Galveston, it is no venture to say, there cannot be found a place combining to any thing like the same extent, the essential conditions of a grand military and naval station, such as this nation should not consent longer to dispense with.

“While Portland remains undefended, no adequate protection can be afforded, at any practicable expense, to Boston and New York. But make it, as the plain necessity and duty of the country require, at once the Quebec and Halifax of the United States, from which the thunders of their power may be launched, by sea or land, at the touch of the telegraphic wire, and a most certain and practicable means of defence will have been provided for those great commercial emporiums.

“Within a very brief time after the breaking out of hostilities between this country and England—distant be the day when such an event shall happen!—Portland, with only her present means of defence, would, there can be little doubt, be in possession of the enemy. With a British fleet in her harbor and a British army on her heights, the merchants of Boston and New

York will readily understand what would be the almost certain consequences to their commerce, and the imminence of the danger to which their own cities would be exposed.

“To perfect the defences of this State, there are required not only the military works upon her coast at which I have hinted, but the construction of military roads—railways—for their connection with each other and with our northern boundary.”

The government of Maine has not been unmindful of its duty to the Federal Government or itself in this time of public peril. Not only did his Excellency promptly respond to the invitation of the President, in the official note of the Secretary of State, to take measures for the proper defence of the State, promptly sending commissioners to Washington to confer with the Federal authorities, but in his annual message he publicly says to the legislature of Maine, “I cannot hesitate to recommend to the Legislature to urge upon the authorities of the United States a vigorous prosecution of the necessary works of national defence within our own State, and to tender its ready cooperation by the grant of all the facilities within its power, including the advancement, if required, of such portion of the funds needed for their construction, as may be within its proper ability to furnish.”

This patriotic appeal has been responded to by the legislature, and I am advised that the necessary measures are in progress to place at the service of the Government the means required to complete and perfect the defences of Maine, on the terms proposed by the President, in the official note of the Secretary of War of the 16th of November last. The bill carrying this into effect, passed the popular branch of the legislature of Maine this day, as I learn by telegraph, *unanimously*, on a call of the yeas and nays.

If further proof were wanted of the exposed condition of Maine, or of the patriotic spirit of its people, I might cite to you other words of the Governor on this subject, where after referring to the assurances of the readiness of the Federal Government to refund the moneys advanced, he says: “But were it certain that the Government of the United States could so far fail in the performance of its just obligations, as to refuse to guaranty the repayment of such moneys as might be advanced by the State for its benefit, the duty of the latter would nevertheless remain, to take care, so far as she has the power, of her own citizens, and to protect her soil from the tread of the invader. And this duty she will not neglect, whether there be immediate danger of a foreign war or not.”

Maine has suffered too much already, in times past, to willingly remain passive under the neglects of the Federal authorities. The battle-ground of the French and English races, for one hundred and fifty years after its settlement, the region in which the first open resistance to British aggression was put forth, and the first notions of revolt and independence uttered, its chief commercial city, Portland, laid in ashes October 18th, 1775; the people of Maine are too familiar with the horrors of war, to disregard the impending struggle, threatened by European powers.

It is useless longer to disguise our fears, that the British Gov-

ernment will, at an early day, demand the opening of the ports of the cotton States, or in some other method, involve the two nations in a war. Her governing classes have no sympathy with our peculiar form of government, and her commercial enterprise, finds in us already, a formidable rival. The strength of the British nation is her navy, and her commercial marine. Were she to lose the dominion of the seas, she would fall at once into the position of a second-rate power, if not into comparative insignificance among the nations of Europe. Hence, her eagerness to divide our nation, weaken our power upon the ocean, and retain her boasted supremacy of the seas. This is the secret of her diplomacy, and we must be prepared for an early rupture, of our present apparently friendly relations with Great Britain.

In this event, without immediate means of defence, Maine must fall at once into British hands, and all that region of the States of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont, which lies east of the line of the Portland and Montreal railway, will be, for the time being, annexed practically to the British Crown. British North America, would in that event, become a powerful rival of the United States, as she only needs an outlet by railway to the Atlantic ocean, at some good harbor, open at all seasons of the year, to have every facility to acquire material greatness, and political importance and power. The British North American possessions extend across the continent upon our northern frontier, from ocean to ocean, with an extent of territory greater than that of the United States. Her Pacific possessions lying west of the head waters of Lake Superior, are among the most valuable regions of the earth for settlement, having for the most part a mild climate, from the fact of its being a comparative plain, a productive soil, rich minerals, and abundant deposits of coal. Through this territory it is confidently asserted, is found the best route for a railway to the Pacific north of the 32d parallel of north latitude at El Paso. Here the snows are less than in the Rocky Mountains, and the climate softer than that, of a similar latitude, on the Atlantic slope.

The value of British North America to the nation, as a home for her surplus population, was formerly but little understood, nor till years after the peace of 1783; though its value, as the foundation of empire, was fully comprehended by the sagacious Champlain, the founder of the French power in the new world. There is now extant, a military memoir from Champlain to the Minister of State, dated about 1630, urging the occupation of the sea coast of Maine, and the building of a military road to Montreal, as indispensable to the permanence of French Empire in America.

The conquest of Canada from France, transferring to England four-fifths of the continent, was due to England's greatest war minister, William Pitt, afterwards Lord Chatham, who, coming into power in place of a weak predecessor, changed the history of the new world. A hundred years hence, when the development of English civilization in America shall show the true grandeur of his achievements, his name will be *second* only in the annals of his nation. His fervid oratory and civil honors will be remembered far

less than his transcendent genius, in seizing, with a giant's grasp, the military resources of the nation, and hurling 50,000 men upon the unprepared French. The overthrow of the French power in America, and the consequent development of the commercial and military spirit of England—which has kept pace with the growth of her own race in the new world—has raised her to a pitch of national greatness, which her great rival, with eight millions more of home population, has never yet been able to equal.*

The progress of the United States since their separation from England has added renown to British institutions, and helped to extend its laws, its language, its literature, and its civilization. So great had become the sympathies of race, that the people of the United States were unprepared for such an exhibition of hostility towards us as that recently manifested by the Government and people of Great Britain. We had outgrown, in a great measure, the prejudices of former years, and shared, in common with the people of the British North American Provinces, a common pride in the achievements, the history, the language, and the literature of our British ancestors.

We had imagined that a common origin and a common faith had implanted in the minds of the people of both countries a kindred sympathy for the rights of man, and an equal abhorrence of chattel slavery. The ties of lineage had been cemented by the additional bonds of commercial intercourse, and by lines of railroad, built by joint labor, in a kindred spirit, and for mutual and reciprocal advantage.

Lord Brougham, in 1837, in the British Parliament, advised the uniting of the various British North American Colonies into a Confederacy, as the only means of counterbalancing the Colossal Republic of the west. This idea has ever since been gaining strength, and finds expression in the efforts to construct a military road in the form of a railway from Halifax to Quebec across the territory wrongfully taken from Maine.

Canada, which contained at the conquest, or one hundred years ago, but 70,000 persons, and those of French origin, had, in 1861, a population of 2,501,888 persons, and of these, 880,607 are of French origin. The Provinces of Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edwards Island and New Foundland contained, in 1861, a population of 3,271,570 persons, more than the entire population of the United States at the time of the Revolution, showing an increase of 795,110 persons in ten years, a ratio of increase equal to 32-10 per cent. over the population of 1851.

The annexation of the entire State of Maine to the Province of Canada, and the formation of British North American Federation, has, for years, been the favorite idea of her leading statesmen.

The Halifax *Morning Journal*, under this heading, had the following article, which shows the views entertained in Nova Scotia, on this grave subject a year or more since :

“ There is no portion of the United States with which Great Britain parted so reluctantly as she did with Maine. Indeed, it was likely to draw the two

*In 1861 the population of France was 37,382,225; that of the British Isles was 29,334,788.

countries, for the third time, into a war. Her far sighted statesmen, many years ago, recognized its importance, and the hope that it might be regained has never become quite extinct. There was 'more truth than poetry' in the paragraph set afloat a year ago, that Canada was about to purchase Maine, and now there is a fair prospect that the much coveted territory may be more cheaply obtained. In the much wished for event of a Consolidation of the Colonies, the possession of Maine is of vast importance; more, perhaps, than we have been wont to imagine. A glance at the map will show that at present, she destroys the symmetry of the proposed confederation—she stands like a wedge, driven up to the butt in a foreign country, and it gives rise to the idea, that but a few more blows are needed to effect a complete separation of Canada and New Brunswick. Nor is it symmetry alone which demands the annexation of Maine; there are other reasons, of far greater importance, why this should, if possible, be effected, and which we propose to set plainly forth in this article.

“Maine, from its position, being bounded on the north, east, and west, to a great extent, by the British Provinces, receives a large proportion of their trade, and by constant intercourse those living upon the borders have become, on one side *Americanized*, and upon the other *British Americanized*. The effect has thus been to assimilate, to some extent, the character of the people, while the intercourse of Maine with the neighboring States is comparatively small. In the event of the Gulf States forming a Southern Confederation, an event which every day renders more probable, an effort will be made to exclude the Northern States, entirely, from the carrying trade; and as the South can carry out a non-intercourse law, without loss to herself, but to the great detriment of the Northern States, it is not at all improbable that she will seek, in this way, to repay some of the wrongs the North has inflicted. This, to Maine, would prove particularly disastrous. Maine is largely engaged in ship-building; she builds annually one-half of the shipping of the United States, and owns fully one-third of it; upon this fleet her prosperity depends, and this looks to the Southern carrying trade for support. It is evident that any attempt to evade Southern laws, and obtain cargoes for their ships, would be attended with many disadvantages, if not actual loss, and, thrown upon the market, they would be placed at the mercy of European purchasers, and the price reduced at once to a mere song.

“Like the remainder of the Northern States, Maine will have to suffer the inevitable depreciation of property, consequent upon disunion, varying from 25 to 50 per cent. United to these colonies, her ships excluded from the ban, and with the field for fresh enterprizes thus opened to her, property would regain its wonted figure, or even rise above it. Maine would never consent to be a bob to the tail of that erratic kite—Massachusetts; and it would be utter ruin to her if she were to do so. Nor do the people of Maine require to have these facts urged upon them; they are fully alive and awake to their own interests, which clearly tend toward a union with the Colonies. Canada, however, has no power to enable her to acquire territory, and Maine must present her claims at the Court of Victoria, ere she can become a member of the happy colonial family over which this noble lady draws gently the reins of government. We cannot doubt that this petition would be met without serious objections, and no time will be lost in placing Maine on an equality with these colonies, who can boast, at least, of a government more stable, yet still as free as that under which she has heretofore prospered.

“A glance at the map will show that a large portion of Canada, indeed, nearly the whole of its vast territory, is dependent upon a single line of communication, for the exports and imports, within its borders. Even that is only available at certain seasons. Neither has she the sea ports required for her shipping, and those she possesses are closed for the winter months. Every year more and more land is cleared, her products are larger, and so are her imports. The necessity for cheaper and more expeditious means of transpor-

tation, and the necessary sea ports which shall be available at all seasons of the year, are becoming every day of greater importance to the growth and prosperity of the country. Through Maine lies the nearest route to the sea, and her numberless bays and harbors are nowhere equaled. Canada has not a sea port at which her steamers can touch during the winter season, and since the line has been in operation, Portland has been made the winter harbor. These advantages are of such vast importance to the future growth and prosperity of Canada, that we feel it to be quite unnecessary to say more.

“Portland is, without doubt, destined to become a large and flourishing city. It is even now the natural *entrepot* of Canada and the great West. In the event of annexation, its growth may be somewhat accelerated, and this will be largely to the detriment of the Canadian cities. Where it is all one country, this, of course would not be so seriously felt. Possessing a harbor unequaled on this side of the Atlantic (save by our own) and free from ice in the winter months, those in Canada, who are engaged in shipping would transfer their property thither, to the direct loss of Montreal and Quebec. This, however, is but one of those fluctuations, to which all new countries are liable; and capital, in the end, is sure to gather capital, and remain where it can be best employed. Portland, without doubt, would be made a military and naval station, though we think the advantages accruing from these are, in most cases, greatly over estimated. Portland will, in a few years, have an entire monopoly over the trade of the West. The present season, the Grand Trunk Railway has been overburdened with freight, of which they were not able to carry a tithe, and this route is much more expeditious, and consequently cheaper than by the southern routes through New York. The trade, of itself, will, in a few years, build up a city which, for wealth and importance, shall rival New York. For example, a barrel of flour from the West can be delivered in Portland for 35 cents per barrel cheaper than in New York or Boston, by other routes. Shipments the other way can, of course, be made at a corresponding reduction, which gives Portland a monopoly over the western markets, and a control over the flour and grain, which will give her, in time, the exclusive shipment of these articles.

“From these calculations, based on good and reliable authority, it will be seen that Portland has a glowing future before her, and that her interests and those of Canada are, even now, inseparably linked, by that strongest of ties—a railroad.

“If the union of Canada and Maine be effected, we must bid farewell to the long cherished hope of directing thither the trade of Canada, and making this port in winter the terminus of the Canadian line of steamers. We must not expect the cooperation of Canada in constructing an inter-colonial railway. Yet in the lieu of these, we should attain other advantages, perhaps equally as valuable. We should have a large market open to us for the sale of our fish and other products, and a cheaper market to purchase our provisions in. The coasting trade of Maine would be open to our shipping, and her fisheries to the competition of our fishermen. Instead of the inter-colonial railway, we should have what is cheaper, and would doubtless prove more remunerative, a line of steamers between this port and Portland; but this should not debar us from extending our present railway to the Gulf, tapping its trade ere our neighbors wholly monopolize it. By turning thither the surplus energy of Maine, which, pent up in so small a space, would prove highly dangerous and combustible, it would supply a great and necessary want to these Colonies. With the enterprise that has given the United States a world-wide reputation, to develop the unlimited resources of the Provinces, extending railways, and building new ones, opening mines and quarries, extending the fisheries, giving an impetus to ship-building, lumbering, manufacturing, and farming, the federation might rise in a few years to a high and enviable position among the great nations of the world.”

These views will excite no surprise in the mind of any one who

remembers that most unfortunate, to the United States, that most discreditable controversy, as to our northeastern boundary, terminated by the treaty of Washington, in 1842, involving the surrender, on our part, of the most valuable military possession upon this continent, if we regard British power as permanently established in America. To fully comprehend this question requires a knowledge of the history of English colonization in that portion of North America—matters quite imperfectly understood—and an acquaintance with those accidents of fortune, that have changed the destiny of races in the new world.

The Spaniards, the Dutch, and the French were each superior to England in political power, and commercial influence, at the close of the 16th century. Each nation had claimed the bulk of what is now the United States and the British North American Provinces, and had so delineated the territory, on their respective maps. England made no claim to it, by the right of discovery by Cabot, till the reign of Elizabeth. No occupation of it by Europeans, north of Florida, was made, till the early part of the 17th century, when France and England, in 1602, set on foot, simultaneously, or nearly so, projects for the occupation and colonization of the country—those of the French having the favor of the government, those of England relying at first solely on individual support. Both France and England claimed, what is now New England and the Lower British Provinces; and sought, at the same time, to colonize and people it. The peninsular region east of Lake Champlain and south of the St. Lawrence was granted, under the name of ACADIE, in 1603, by Henry the IV of France, and in 1606, by King James of England, to their respective subjects—the English calling it, originally, North Virginia, till, in 1614, it was named New England, from the belief that, like Old England, it was an island, a condition it has since attained, by the cutting of the Northern Canal, from the Hudson River into Lake Champlain. The people of both nations occupied the country under their respective grants—the French settling upon the Bay of Fundy, in 1604, the English in Maine, in 1607-'8—and soon became engaged in continual strife, till in 1697, by the peace of Ryswick, the St. Croix was made the line of boundary. A due north line from the source of the St. Croix to the water shed that separates the streams flowing northward, into the St. Lawrence, from those flowing into the Bay of Fundy, became the line of boundary. The northern boundary of Maine extended to the same ridge, and thence along its crest westward; till the 45th parallel of north latitude was reached, and thence to the St. Lawrence River, the ancient admitted boundary.

After the conquest of Canada from France, the British Government established, in 1763, the new District Quebec. The line of its southern boundary was made coterminus with the northern boundary of Maine, following the line of the dividing ridge, or rain shed—in all ages regarded as the natural boundary of States—from the line of the 45th parallel of latitude to the northwest angle of Nova Scotia.

After the war of the Revolution, which left to England nothing

in America but her ancient colonies of New Foundland and Nova Scotia, and the territory recently conquered from France,—when the original thirteen colonies were admitted into the community of nations, as the United States of America, the boundary was established by the treaty of 1783, following out the same words of description as used, in defining the new District of Quebec in 1763.

But in the war of 1812 with the United States, the military men of England saw that the carrying out of the treaty of 1783 would extend the territory of Maine so far north, as to interpose a complete barrier between the upper and lower British Provinces, and isolate Quebec and Halifax, one the great military, and the other the great naval station of Great Britain on this continent. Troops were landed at Halifax in winter, pushed across our territory in the St. John valley into Canada, and thrown against our forces on the western frontier.

Again, in 1837, during the Canadian rebellion, the same course was adopted, and the extreme value for military purposes of the St. John valley route was established. Holding it by military possession after the war of 1812, and assuming jurisdiction over it against right, her claim ripened in time into strength, which menaced a war in 1838 and 1839.

Intent on securing peace with England on any terms, the United States in 1842 forced Maine into a surrender of her territory on terms dictated by superior force, and left to England the possession of this key to her North American Provinces. In the language of an eminent geographer of England, made use of during the pending negotiations with England, which terminated in the Ashburton treaty, “no language could have been employed, with the then existing knowledge of the physical geography of the country, more clearly establishing the claim of the United States to the entire territory, than that made use of in the treaty of 1783.”

This opinion is shared by every intelligent mind, was not questioned for years, nor until the joint commission of the United States and Great Britain ran and established the due north line from the source of St. Croix across and beyond the St. John river above the Grand Falls, when the discovery was made by the English Ministry that the line of boundary ought to take a new direction, leaving to them the entire basin of the St. John river. The vast military importance of this route by the St. John valley was overlooked by the authorities of the United States, and cannot be adequately realized now, except in contemplating the possibility of a war with England, and the completion of a military road in the form of a railway between Halifax and Quebec, entirely through British territory, in the valley of the St. John, across territory acquired from us, by the treaty of 1842.

After the conclusion of the treaty of Washington, in 1842. Maine ceased, apparently, to be an object of attention to the United States Government. The military posts on the northern and eastern frontier were abandoned, and nearly all means of defence of its ports and harbors neglected. A few trifling appropriations were occasionally made to carry on the work of construction at

one or two forts, fitting them up apparently for the use of an enemy, for requisitions for guns, made on the Ordnance Bureau, year after year, by the Engineer Department, were totally disregarded, and remain so to this hour.

An appropriation for the defence of the mouth of the Kennebec River, upon which is situated the State capital and other flourishing cities, made in 1857, was purposely withheld by a former Administration, and entirely overlooked by the present one, for months after it came into power, and until after the issuing of Mr. Seward's circular letter of October 14, and the arrival of Commissioners from Maine; when, on the 23d of November, 1861, the Secretary of War, at their urgent solicitation and request, ordered the work put in progress.

Further than all this, a just and valid claim upon the Federal Government, for strip and waste of the timber upon that portion of the St. John Basin, which Maine now retains, the remnant not given up to Great Britain by the treaty, lying on the south bank of the river St. John, has never, to this hour, been paid. Maine attempted, in 1838 and 1839, to protect this territory from spoliation by military force, but the United States Government interfered, and assumed the duty of defending it. This duty was so imperfectly discharged, that the most valuable timber upon it was taken off by the provincial lumbermen, and floated down the St. John river, before the treaty was consummated, and the jurisdiction of Maine restored to her.

Submitting with the best grace that was possible to loss of territory and of military and commercial importance, the people of Maine have sought in every way, to observe and fulfill their duties to the Federal Government, and to cultivate friendly relations with their provincial neighbors.

The violation of the spirit of the treaty of 1842, which professed to give to the people of both countries the free navigation of the St. John river, by the imposition of a transit duty on all lumber floated upon its waters, did not affect our sovereignty, but was an invasion upon individual right. These wrongs we believe are chargeable upon the imperial, rather than the colonial government. In point of fact, the most friendly spirit has shown itself between the people of different races and nationalities occupying the northern States and the British Provinces, who would have always been friends but for the interference of the imperial governments of England and France. As early as 1651, the French population of Canada, and the English colonists of New England, mutually labored to bring about and agree upon an union or league, for their joint and mutual protection, but their humane efforts were thwarted by the home governments of France and England, neither of whom would consent to it.

The English Government, however, made the most liberal concessions to the French Canadians, from motives of policy, after the conquest, pledging the faith of the nation for the full enjoyment of their rights of property, their ancient laws and religion, at the same time that they commenced a series of exactions upon the

people of the original thirteen colonies, which drove them into revolt.

This portion of England's history, her treatment of the thirteen United Colonies—who planted its race on American soil; who aided the subjugation of the French, and permanently established here the institutions and laws of England, and who had, at all times shown their entire devotion to duty, as British subjects, but who refused to have their lands parceled out to the retainers of the king, or their property destroyed by burdensome taxation for their support—is the darkest stain upon her national honor. It finds no favor now, either in the British nation or her colonies.

The United Colonies, before declaring themselves independent, invited Canada to join them in their revolt, but failed of success in negotiation, and, subsequently, in their effort to conquer it, by the merest accident, or chance of war.

The people of the United States, at the conclusion of the war of the Revolution, in common with those of the British Provinces, felt the desirableness of maintaining friendly relations. Our Government proposed to England, that the citizens of the States and the Provinces should be free from custom-house dues, and allowed to participate in reciprocal trade, on equal terms. The proposal was promptly refused by England. Two years later it was made the subject of distinct negotiation by the United States Government, but again denied. In 1789, it was again renewed by our Government, to be again peremptorily rejected. No relaxation of her restrictive system was allowed till 1822, during all which period an American vessel could not enter and discharge its cargo in a Colonial port. With the growth of the population of the two countries, and the gradual approximation of their settlements, trade naturally sprung up between us and our Provincial neighbors, and the restrictive policy of England was necessarily relaxed after 1822. In 1827, the amount of Colonial imports into the United States was \$445,000, against \$2,704,014 of exports to all the British North American Colonies.

Immediately on the settlement of our north-eastern boundary dispute, in 1842, the most friendly intercourse sprung up between the people of Maine and the Colonies, along the frontier. In 1843 and 1844, the people of Maine entered into discussion of projects for railways, to the Provinces, proposing one northward to Montreal, and another eastward to St. John and Halifax. The building of the line to Montreal was entered upon in 1844, the work of construction commenced in 1846, and completed, through to Montreal, in 1853. This gave a new impulse to Colonial trade, increased the friendly spirit of the people of both countries, and aided the consummation of the Reciprocity Treaty of June 5, 1854—a measure of great political and commercial value to the whole country, though interfering, almost ruinously, with the timber trade of Maine. The effect of this measure is seen in the table below, showing the value of the export and import trade between the United States and British North American Provinces, at the periods named below, viz :

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Table showing the trade between the United States and British North America.

Year.	Imports.	Exports.	Total.	Excess of exports.
1827,	\$445,000	\$2,704,014	\$3,149,014	\$2,269,014
1849,	2,826,880	5,632,106	6,758,986	3,105,226
1852,	6,110,299	10,509,016	16,519,305	4,398,717
1853,	7,550,604	13,140,642	20,691,246	5,590,038
1854,	8,927,560	24,566,660	33,494,320	15,639,300
1855,	15,136,734	27,906,020	42,942,754	12,669,286
1856,	21,310,421	29,029,349	50,339,870	7,718,928
1857,	22,124,296	24,262,482	46,368,778	2,139,186
1858,	15,806,519	23,651,727	39,458,246	7,845,205
1859,	19,727,551	23,154,174	37,881,725	8,426,623
1860,	23,851,381	22,706,328	46,557,709	
1861,	23,062,933	22,745,613	45,808,546	

The direct trade between Portland and Montreal, and its rapid increase is shown by the return of exports and imports at the port of Island Pond, the custom house station in Vermont, near the Boundary, on the line of the Grand Trunk railway.

Statement of the value of Imports, Foreign Exports, Domestic Exports, and Total Exports, from and into the port of Island Pond, District of Vermont, during the years, 1853, 1854, 1855, 1856, 1857, 1858, 1859, 1860, 1861.

Years.	EXPORTS.			Imports.
	Foreign.	Domestic.	Total.	
1853,	\$53,186	\$24,307	\$77,493	\$151,514
1854,	2,020,820	147,732	2,168,552	727,514
1855,	2,010,907	168,059	2,179,966	880,512
1856,	2,713,049	207,997	2,921,046	1,347,509
1857,	4,138,363	142,525	4,280,888	1,871,023
1858,	2,747,718	179,003	2,926,721	1,299,049
1859,	5,086,795	220,658	5,307,453	1,493,940
1860,	6,165,927	272,323	6,438,250	2,051,866
1861,	6,608,509	219,746	6,828,255	2,005,350
Total,	\$31,545,274	\$1,582,350	\$33,127,624	\$12,528,277

Custom House, District of Vermont,
Collector's Office, Burlington, 28th January, 1862.
Treasury Department, Register's Office,

WM. CLAPP, *Collector.*

J. A. GRAHAM, *Acting Register.*

Although the business of the port of Island Pond appears on the United States custom house returns, as belonging to the district of

Vermont, it legitimately belongs to the port of Portland, in Maine, the Canadian packet station, and the ocean terminus of the Grand Trunk railway.

This brief historic sketch, with the commercial data and statistics given, will enable the Secretary of War to understand the views of the people of Maine, and the method of dealing with Great Britain. Her assailable point is her North American possessions. These taken from her, our commercial and political importance would be increased to the extent she is weakened thereby. The people of these colonies, like our own in their social habits and tastes, are more in sympathy with our institutions, than with those of the old world. Their country is full of natural resources, is destitute, or comparatively deficient, in capital, like the United States; and change from their institutions to ours, would produce very little shock of their social system.

Our obvious duty therefore, is to cultivate friendly relations with the British North American Provinces, and show to England our ability to conquer these Provinces in case she makes war on us. While indignantly repelling the imputation of any desire for such a result, and desiring to maintain the most friendly relations with England and with our Provincial neighbors, we ought not to allow the British nation to dictate terms to us in reference to the Southern rebellion.

That such is to be her policy, that England will seek some pretext for interfering with us, if not insisting on the opening of the cotton ports, is a matter of course. She will not be true to her traditional history, if she allows this nation to go on in its career of development, a united and prosperous people, to that pitch of political and commercial greatness that we had imagined to be its manifest destiny. She is charged with having made war on every nation upon the globe, having the organized form of nationality, except the empire of Japan.

To ensure peace with England, therefore, we must be prepared to strike her in her tenderest point, to launch a thousand of the swiftest privateers upon her commerce, even at the expense of seeing our cities laid in ashes. We must accustom our local militia to the use of arms and of heavy ordnance, and rely on the spirit of our volunteers to build and man forts or earthwork batteries, at every navigable bay or inlet, and every opening on the frontier, exposed to the incursions of an enemy.

The national Government, by supplying armaments for the forts, and arms and munitions for our volunteers, can rely on the local population for the fighting men.

The jealousy of England lies deeper than the cotton question. Had she wanted a supply of cotton only, she had but to *will* the rebellion crushed, and the power of the insurgents was broken. The outflow of cotton would, in that event, before this time have been abundant. So far from this, her policy has been to urge on the rebellion, and give to its leaders, aid, countenance, and support. She has labored insidiously, through every avenue of influence, to encourage the South; she admitted them to the equality

of belligerents almost at the start—a practical admission of their independence, and there is no reason to doubt that the British Government was in league with the chief conspirators from the first overt act of rebellion.

It is irrational to suppose that England will interfere directly in favor of the rebels, till she sees their power giving way before our victorious arms. Her course will be that of a fomenter of discord, till she can appear as an assumed pacificator, asking for peace, at the expense of the Union, as a final measure of diplomacy. Should we achieve overwhelming success in battle, this will compel her open support of the traitors.

England displayed at once, her hostile character, on the breaking out of the rebellion. She sent troops to Canada and her other North American Provinces, and has kept a huge fleet, in conjunction with the French, in the harbor of Halifax from early spring till now, or hovering along the northern coast of the United States.

She has interfered in the affairs of Mexico, in direct contradiction of her professions made to this Government, when she led it to put forth, what is popularly known as "*the Monroe doctrine,*" an idea originating in the fertile brain of a British diplomatist.

The first sign of rebellion was the signal for immense warlike preparation as a menace to us, long before the Trent affair came off in November last.

She roused the hostile spirit of the Nation to a flaming fury on that act, and then accepts our surrender of Mason and Slidel with evident regret. She now proposes to wait till her fleet of gunboats already prepared and carefully fitted for passage through the Welland Canal, can take command of the Lakes, before she strikes us in our most tender point.

On the 18th of February, 1861, one of the boldest men of his time, thoroughly trained in the art of war, took the oath of office as Provisional President of the Southern Confederacy—the chosen leader of five millions of people, distinguished for the higher qualities of military daring, trained to habits of leadership in politics and in war. To the hereditary love and use of political power, was thereby added the responsibilities of office and the pride of personal success. Thinking men have stood amazed from that hour to this at the self-complacent indifference that has regarded this stupendous revolt, as a trifling accident, or a thing of easy disposal. Intelligent foreigners, and many at home, have seen, that had we realized the significance, we should have taken prompt and efficient means at the outset to put it down by force. Instead of this, on the 22d of February next, the inauguration of this same man will take place as President by popular election, for the term of six years, over a government, styled by themselves as permanent, in place of the Provisional Government of last year. Official information of this will be sent to England. On the return to us from England of this official information sent there by the Southern Confederacy, to be laid before our Government with a demand for its recognition, we shall realize the danger, our past

supineness has brought upon the Government, unless it promptly corrects its errors. Indifference to danger, is a weakness more culpable than cowardice.

We beg leave, therefore, to ask you, Mr. Secretary, to take the most decisive measures to hold England in check. As her assailable point is her North American possessions, through Maine, a few millions promptly expended in defending Maine and in preparing to strike her from that point, is the cheapest method of preserving peace. The means to which we invite your attention to this end are—

1. *The making of Portland harbor an impregnable naval and military station, by a system of sea and land defence.*
2. *An interior line of railway from Portland to Boston and New York, (requiring only forty miles of new line,) sufficiently inland to be free from interruption or attack by water.*
3. *A line of railway from Portland to Madawaska, (already built to Bangor,) with a branch to Houllon, (a former military station of the United States,) and a branch to the boundary, in the direction of St. John and Halifax.*
4. *The fortification of several leading ports and harbors in Maine, as above set forth.*
5. *The organization of a local military force, to be employed in construction or defence of works proposed, under the superintendence of the United States Government.*

A bill to carry out these measures is herewith submitted. A small annual grant, *per mile*, for carrying mails, troops, public stores, and munitions of war, will secure the completion of the lines of railway proposed.

Appended hereto, are the reports from the Engineer and Ordnance Bureaus, on the defences of Maine.

This system of defence perfected, Maine could resist all attacks by sea or land, and in the event of a war with England, the United States could throw at once an overwhelming force upon the upper and lower British provinces, and strike the power of England from the continent.

The final result of English colonization in America, so confidently predicted by Lord Byron—the transfer to the new world of the civilization and the power of the English race—will be hastened, rather than retarded, by the recent disturbances, that for a time threatened the integrity of our National Union. The conflict between two rival systems of civilization, that for more than two hundred years had been gathering strength for the present struggle, was precipitated upon us by the South, in the belief that they should obtain an early recognition of their independence from the great powers of Europe—England and France. The mind of John C. Calhoun, the recognized author of the doctrine of secession, never suggested a higher destiny for the slave States than a return, on their part, to a condition of colonial dependence; and the ambition of their leaders now, is directed to that sole object, in the hope to gain thereby, new guarantees for slavery. The British Government readily assents to this proposal, in the hope of check-

ing, thereby, the growth and the political power of the United States. The contest, therefore, between us and England, will resolve itself into one of ideas, on which the people of Great Britain will divide, and the moral sense of the nation ultimately triumph. The independence of the United States was achieved, through the public sentiment of England, rising at last above, and superior to the follies and errors of its Government.

The people of the loyal States, heretofore intent on civil pursuits, had become forgetful of their political rights and duties, and the present rebellion, fearful and disastrous as it is to their material prosperity, was to them a necessary lesson. Purified, refreshed, and invigorated by the contest, the nation itself, crushing all opposition, at home and abroad, will rise superior to every obstacle, and stand forth, to the admiration of coming generations, as the Model Republic.

In appealing to you, Mr. Secretary, in this hour of trial, and of threatened attack from abroad, I am strengthened by the belief that you will bring to the consideration of this matter, a mind, enlarged by study, and strengthened by reflection—of sufficient grasp to realize its magnitude and importance, without withdrawing attention from the immediate duties that press upon your thoughts. Your advent to the War Office has given a confidence and courage to the nation, and a steady guidance of its resources and its military power upon the rebel forces will soon achieve success, no matter how many obstacles now obstruct your path.

Fortunate, in every age, has that minister of state been regarded to whom great trusts and responsibilities are confided. In times of foreign invasion, or domestic insurrection, great minds must assume the responsibility of public office, which in times of peace, naturally fall into weak and incompetent hands.

Our hereditary notions of perpetual peace have been broken by the fiercest, the most unnatural, and the most atrocious war, that has signalized modern times; and such an opportunity for the exhibition of greatness, as that tendered to you, has rarely been offered to a War Minister. While, therefore, we ask the adoption of the most efficient measures to keep off the interference of foreign nations, we also ask, that no relaxation of effort be permitted, toward crushing the southern rebellion. That few realized its strength or its enormity at the outset, and that so many in places of trust, are still incapable of comprehending the momentous issues involved, make the duties of your office doubly difficult and onerous; while the renown that shall adhere to, and follow your success, will be all the more deserved and enduring.

The question now in issue is not as to the rights of property, the extinction or preservation of chattel slavery, however much this matter might have influenced the motives of men at the outset of this struggle. The issue now before us is, as to the existence of popular institutions, of an elective Executive—the great fact of popular representative government. It is our form of government that is now on trial. If this nation at this time, fails to vindicate its power to restrain recusant States in their attempts to fly off

from the central system; and to punish and repress capricious revolt, attempted without justifiable cause; or in other words, if this Confederacy can be deliberately broken up, at the mere pleasure of a State, or a section of the Union; the principle on which it was originally founded will be found to have been an error. If, on the contrary, the law of the strongest is to be the test of the right of our Government, as of all others, let us call forth, and put in exercise the entire power of the nation, at the earliest moment, strike down insurrection and ward off invasion, so that the peace that shall follow the success of our arms, shall be perpetual, and worthy of the cause that has secured it.

With the highest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN A. POOR,

Commissioner of Maine.

I received from the Secretary of War the following reply:

War Department, Washington, February 18, 1862.

Sir:—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date, together with the letter of Governor Washburn addressed to yourself; also a copy of the late act passed by the Legislature of Maine, in relation to the public defence; a copy of the proposed bill to provide for the public defence; and a copy of your letter addressed to me, under the date of the 31st of January.

The importance of the subject of these several papers is fully appreciated: it will receive my earnest attention, and so far as any measures prescribed by the wisdom of Congress may depend upon the War Department they shall be promptly executed.

Your obedient servant,

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Hon. JOHN A. POOR, Commissioner, State of Maine.

On the 12th of February, 1862, the Fortification Bill passed the Senate with the following amendments or additions, made on motion of the Hon. W. P. Fessenden, Chairman of the Committee on Finance, which after various verbal corrections finally took the form following:

“For continuation of the work at Fort Scammell, Portland harbor, Maine, \$75,000.”

“For the erection of temporary works in Maine, and at the harbor of Portsmouth, New Hampshire, when in the judgment of the President, the same or any part thereof shall be advisable, \$550,000.”

The Bill thus amended, became a law February 20th, 1862.

Some expenditures upon forts in Maine had been made prior to the war of 1812, but these had been comparatively small sums.

The following table gives a list of the appropriations made by

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the United States government for fortifications in the State of Maine since 1840, specifying the amount appropriated for each work annually :

Year.	Fort Preble.	Fort Scammell.	Fort Gorges.	Fort Popham.	Fort Knox.
1840, . .	3,000	3,000	—	—	—
1842, . .	1,000	5,000	—	—	—
1843, . .	—	—	—	—	25,000
1845, . .	10,000	—	—	—	25,000
1846, . .	10,000	25,000	—	—	35,000
1848, . .	9,000	10,000	—	—	10,000
1849, . .	—	5,000	—	—	20,000
1850, . .	—	5,000	—	—	20,000
1853, . .	—	—	—	—	50,000
1854, . .	—	—	—	—	20,000
1855, . .	—	—	—	—	60,000
1856, . .	—	—	—	—	60,000
1857, . .	—	—	50,000	100,000	50,000
1858, . .	—	—	40,000	—	—
1859, . .	—	—	40,000	—	20,000
1860, . .	—	—	30,000	—	20,000
1861, . .	—	—	30,000	—	20,000
Ex. session '61,	—	—	15,000	—	20,000
1862, . .	—	75,000	150,000	—	150,000

The Legislature of Maine having passed all the laws advised by you for the carrying into effect the arrangement of November 16th, 1861, I gave notice thereof, by your direction, to the government by the following note, delivered to the Secretary of the Treasury :

Washington, March 22, 1862.

Sir :—I have the honor to lay before you, by request of His Excellency, the Governor of Maine, a copy of an act passed by the Legislature of that State, and approved March 13th, 1862, authorizing the taking of land for Forts or other public defences within said State, together with a copy of the letter of the Governor, under date of the 14th inst. enclosing said copy, with the request to lay the same before you, assuring the United States government of the deep interest of Maine in the work of defence proposed ; also a printed copy of the act of the Maine Legislature, approved February 12th, 1862, placing at the service of the United States government, all sums of money required to complete the defences of Maine ; also a printed copy of the Resolutions of the Legislature of Maine, approved March 10th, 1862, pointing out the necessary works, required for the defence of the coast and frontier of that State.

From the tenor of these several acts, and resolutions, you will perceive, that the State of Maine has fully met all the requirements

and conditions suggested by the President in the official note of the Secretary of War, under date of November 16th, 1861, addressed to His Excellency, Governor Washburn, as the condition on which the administration would undertake to carry forward and into execution the system of defence within the limits of the State of Maine. Should any further act or thing be required on the part of the authorities of Maine, or any more formal notice called for, to entitle the State to a full benefit of the pledge extended by the President, I beg leave to ask your advice to that effect, assuring you of the prompt action of His Excellency, Governor Washburn in response thereto.

I have the honor to be,

Your most obedient servant,

JOHN A. POOR.

Hon. S. P. CHASE, Sec'y of Treasury of United States.

P. S. I beg leave to hand you a printed copy of a letter dated January 31st, 1862, addressed by me to the Secretary of War by direction of Governor Washburn, setting forth some reasons calling for prompt action, and some suggestions, as to the character of the works of defence proposed.

A similar notice was given to the Secretary of War.

On the 22d of March, 1862, the Hon. John H. Rice introduced into the House, and Hon. L. M. Morrill introduced into the Senate a bill prepared under your direction, designed to carry into effect the policy of the government agreed upon in reference to the defences of Maine. They also submitted the several acts and resolves of the Legislature of Maine upon this subject, which were printed by order of Congress.

The Secretary of War urged the importance of these matters upon the attention of the members of Congress, and called to his assistance E. F. Johnson, Esq., of Middletown, Connecticut, one of the ablest civil engineers in the country, and submitted for his examination and report, all the papers in the case; whose report was subsequently submitted to Congress April 5th, 1862, and printed by their order as follows:

Washington, April 3, 1862.

SIR: The documents* which have been submitted for my examination, relative to the defence of Maine, &c., with a request that

* 1. Message of the President, December 17, 1861, transmitting correspondence with the Governor of Maine.

2. Report of Maine Commissioners, December 28, 1861.

3. Message of Governor Washburn, January 2, 1862.

4. Letter of John A. Poor to Secretary of War, January 31, 1862.

5. General Totten's Report on the Defences of Maine.

6. Governor Washburn's Letters of February 13 and 28, 1862.

I should report thereon, have received from me the most careful attention.

In a private note I had the honor to address you at your request, in January last, I gave you the leading historical facts relating to our northeastern boundary, to the time of its settlement by the treaty of Washington, in 1842.

That boundary, by the treaty of Ghent, was not varied from the same as described in the treaty of 1783. Its description in the latter was in words so clear and explicit as to leave no doubt in the mind of any one disposed to give them a fair construction, as to their true meaning, yet it was twenty-five years from the time when the commissioners from the two governments first met for the purpose of marking the boundary by suitable monuments, to the time of its settlement in 1842.

During this long period the efforts of the agents of the British government were untiring to force that boundary to the south of its true position; efforts in which they were finally partially successful, and for which they were indebted not to the justice of their claim, but to a magnanimous disposition on the part of our government (the consent of Maine having been reluctantly given) to yield the right for the sake of a peaceable settlement of a question which had been long in dispute.

Military and commercial considerations, to which England has ever been keenly alive, indicated strongly the importance of some other mode of communicating with her Canadian possessions than is afforded by the navigation of the St. Lawrence, which for half the year is obstructed by ice, or dangerous.

The Ashburton treaty gave them so much of the valley of the St. John as has enabled them to open a line of communication overland between Halifax and Quebec, within their own territory; but this is very far from being such a communication as is demanded by the growing importance of the Canadas. Halifax, their only seaport of consequence, is 780 miles, nearly, distant from Montreal by this circuitous and otherwise unfavorable route, and hence in the construction of their Grand Trunk Railroad they have been forced to allow its eastern terminus to meet the Atlantic in the State of Maine, at Portland, a point which is only 294 miles from Montreal, with favorable ground intervening for the construction and operation of a railroad, and with a harbor not excelled by any other on the Atlantic seaboard.

This terminus, and the portion of the State of Maine lying north and east of it and of the Grand Trunk road, England covets, and as she has never been particularly scrupulous in her choice of

7. Act of Legislature of Maine, approved Feb. 12, 1862.

8. Resolves of Legislature of Maine, approved March 10, 1862.

9. Act of Legislature of Maine, approved March 13, 1862.

10. Letter of Notice to Secretary of Treasury, March 22, 1862.

11. Senate Bill, No. 239.

12. House Bill, No. 370.

13. Speech of the Governor of New Brunswick to the Legislative Council and House of Assembly, Feb. 12, 1862, and the Reply.

means for gaining a commercial or military advantage, we have a right to suppose that in case of a serious misunderstanding her first hostile movement would be directed to securing possession of and holding permanently, if possible, all that portion of Maine described above. In confirmation of this, I refer to the reasons which have induced the belief now so general of the intention of the British government to take forcible possession of the harbor of Portland, in January last, by way of retaliation for the seizure of Mason and Slidell.

That so serious a movement was contemplated for so slight a provocation is just ground for alarm, and to avoid the like danger in future, and secure peace with England, we must remove the temptation to encroachment now presented by the imperfectly defended condition of that portion of our territory embracing the eastern and northern parts of Maine.

We must, in particular, strengthen the defences of Portland, so as to render it impregnable by land and by water. Other points need attention, but this one in particular should receive the greatest attention, not only because of its being the principal seaport of that region, and the terminus of the Canadian grand trunk line of railway, but because of the necessity of having at least one point on that extended coast which shall be a shelter, a rallying point, and a depot for provisions and munitions, impregnable to any force which may be brought against it.

The natural position of Portland is not unfavorable for the purposes of defence, on the contrary, it is susceptible of being very perfectly defended, whether from attacks by land or water, or both. The character of all that portion of the Atlantic coast is most remarkable for its many natural harbors, so that with all the precautions possible, an enemy might not find it very difficult to make a landing at some point, and hence attacks by land upon Portland and other places, must be apprehended and guarded against.

In respect to the character of the defences proper for Portland, recent events indicate that for the protection of the harbor floating ball-proof batteries will be most effective and essential in connexion with the land batteries. In respect to the latter, a departure to a certain extent from the method of construction hitherto adopted may be advisable.

The superior efficiency of the revolving fire-arms has led to attempts to apply the same principle to heavy guns, which, if successful, will have its value greatly lessened in situations where steam power can conveniently be applied for revolving the tower in which the guns are placed, as in floating batteries and batteries on land. The great weight of the mass to be moved in the latter case, considering the cheapness and effectiveness of the moving power, is probably not an objection of importance, in view of the advantages which, in certain situations, may result from the arrangement.

These are matters, however, respecting which your military advisers are probably more competent to speak than myself.

In arranging a plan of defence, suitable access to the points to be defended must be had from the more central parts of the country.

Portland, by existing lines of railroad, is now accessible from the south, and so is the country east of it in the direction of the line of railroad to Bangor; east and north of Bangor, extending to the Aroostook and Madawaska, there is now a large population which, in case of war with England, will require protection from our government, and it will be highly unjust and discreditable to withhold from them that protection.

This protection can only be properly effected by the extension of a suitable line of railway communication from Bangor east and north—a line which I am informed the State and individuals are ready to build, provided they can receive from the general government such aid as it is in the power of the government to bestow.

This aid it is supposed can be constitutionally given, provided the government desires as a consideration the benefit of the road, when built, for military purposes and the transportation of the mails. A stipulated amount per mile to be paid annually to the proprietors, which need not be very large, will, I am informed, secure the construction of the road and its use for government purposes on reasonable terms.

The protection of our frontier citizens is not the sole object to be attained in a military view by the construction of such a line of railway. In the event of a war with England it will be of the greatest importance to us to enable us to render their communication with the Canadas in winter, within their own limits, impracticable, which can only be effectually done by means of a line of communication which will enable us to reach the valley of the St. John.

In this connection the important fact should not be overlooked that a railway thus constructed will be worth its entire cost, and more, in its effect in developing the resources of that portion of the country.

I cannot conclude this communication without again recurring to the danger which threatens, and the importance of being fully prepared, in the manner proposed, to repel successfully any invasion of our north-eastern territory; a preparation which, if made, will be the most effectual guarantee against such an invasion being attempted.

The real intentions of the English government are apparent in the manner in which their relations with this country are discussed in their leading public journals in England and in the provinces.—In a late number of one of their periodicals is an article on the "Defence of Canada," in which one is at loss which to condemn most, the unfriendly spirit that pervades it, or the bold misstatement of facts in relation to past negotiations upon our international boundaries. This article assumes, most confidently, that the two nations will be at war in the year 1863. In one of their quarterlies, and in Colburn's new monthly, are articles of a similar general character. All of these are calculated, if not designed, to prepare the British mind for the event predicted, and, in connection with the recent action of the provincial authorities, conclusively show that they deem the occurrence of the event certain. The alacrity

with which the comparatively insignificant affair of the Trent was seized upon as a sufficient cause of war, speaks volumes in support of this conclusion. If other evidence is needed of hostile intention towards us, it may be found in the published remarks of the British Colonial Secretary, relative to an ultimate probable necessity on our part to recognize the rebellious south as a separate nationality. The promulgation, by so distinguished a statesman, of an idea which we know can never have a practical existence, if we are not interfered with by other powers, is full of meaning to those who are apt in translating the givings out of so shrewd a diplomatist as Lord John Russell, and, when coupled with the remarks lately made at New Orleans by one of the recently returned rebel emissaries from abroad, can only be construed as evidence of an antagonistic position in the future.

The extraordinary liberality of the State of Maine in offering to advance the means required for the purpose of obtaining the protection recommended, is an assurance that the people of that State (who are better situated than those of other portions of the Union for learning and understanding the views and intentions of the British government) realize fully the danger that threatens.

The bill introduced into Congress by Senator Morrill, of Maine, asking for government aid for the purpose named above, is simple in its details, and practical. It vests in the President a discretion which, from his known character, the nation will feel confident, will be exercised for the best interests of the country, and which is no more than is due to the chief of our military force. It gives to him a power which seems to be needful at this time to check a threatened encroachment by a nation whose past history is replete with repeated aggressions upon the rights of others—a nation which has been treated by us with uniform justice, and towards which our own conduct has been invariably such as to afford no sufficient ground of offence.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

EDWIN F. JOHNSON.

Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, *Secretary of War*.

Notwithstanding the recommendations of the War Office, Congress took no action upon them at its late session.

The Secretary of War at the commencement of the present session of Congress, on the recommendation of General Totten, submitted estimates for the fortifications in Maine, and at the Kittery Navy Yard, as follows, viz :

For Fort Knox,	\$150,000
Popham,	100,000
Corges,	150,000
Scammell,	150,000
New Fort Preble,	150,000
	<hr/>
	700,000

For Fort McClary,	100,000
New Fort Constitution,	200,000
	<hr/>
	\$1,000,000

It may be proper, here to remark, that at the time of your negotiations with the Federal Government, in the fall of 1861, the finances of the country were in a very disturbed condition. The United States securities were at a discount, and the Banks, and the Government itself, were on the eve of a suspension of specie payments. The proposal of Maine, to advance *at par*, in exchange for 6 per cent. Bonds of the United States Government, the funds required for the defences of the State, was regarded at the time with favor, by the Secretary of the Treasury.

The change of policy consequent on the suspension of the Banks, which took place on the 31st of December, 1861, and of the Government on the 1st of January, 1862—rendered the General Government for the time, independent ; and their large issue of demand notes, has given ease to the money market, for the past year. It is due to your administration to say, that the putting in progress the work at the mouth of the Kennebec River, and the larger appropriations since proposed for Maine, and the Portsmouth Navy Yard, are to be traced to the efforts by you made, in this behalf. And if Congress could have been made to realize *the military importance of the plans of defence proposed to it, by the Legislature of Maine*, the nation would not again be called upon to accept any disgraceful submission, like that which followed the arrest of Mason and Slidell.

It was hoped, and upon satisfactory grounds, generally expected, that Gen. Totten would have recommended for the coming year, the permanent fortification of Bangs Island, and the Cape Elizabeth shore opposite ; points of chiefest importance, in any proper defence of the City of Portland ; and a line of land defences, as of other Islands of the Harbor. In justice to him and to the War Department it is proper to say, that all these matters have been carefully considered, and surveys and plans made, by the aid of the coast survey, looking to the most ample and effective defence of the City from attack, from sea, or by land. It is a rule known to military and naval men, that the first danger to a town, in the event of War, is the entrance of a hostile vessel or fleet within its harbor ; and that ability, to destroy any vessel or fleet coming inside, is the paramount duty in defence, because no man-of-war

will lay outside, with a view of laying a place under contribution, if by any possibility, it can enter and lie inside in safety. In view of these considerations, the plans of the War Department propose, in the first place, to make the inside Forts so formidable and powerful, that no vessel of any size, or of any material, or mode of construction or armament, can lie inside Bangs Island. In case of threatened danger, they will place temporary batteries on Bangs Island, and the other outlying Islands, and on the Cape Elizabeth shore, and on the surrounding heights, of sufficient capacity to prevent any approach of ships of War, within reach of the city, or of a land force from any direction.

The sum of \$550,000 already voted by Congress, awaits the disposal of the President for this purpose, in case, in his judgment, the public exigencies shall require its expenditure.

Before bringing this report to a close, it is my duty to state, that while so much has been done, and is doing by the Engineer Bureau, to provide means of defence for Maine, the most shameful neglect characterizes the Ordnance office. As remarked by Gen. Totten, in his report, "*the Forts of Maine in their present condition are a source of weakness and not of strength.*" This continual neglect of the Ordnance Bureau, is the most striking in the case of Fort Knox, where not a gun is mounted, though year after year requisitions have been made; and in Gen. Totten's report of January 4th 1862, he notifies the War office that 55 guns of 8 and 10 inch calibres, were then required for Fort Knox.

Every form of argument that official courtesy can suggest, has been presented. Abundant means are placed at the service of the Ordnance Bureau, but so far as Maine is concerned, with very inadequate results. This will appear by the following note from the chief of the Ordnance Bureau:

Ordnance Office, War Department,
Washington, Dec. 10, 1862.

JOHN A. POOR, Esq., Washington, D. C.

Sir,—Your letter of the 8th inst. to the Secretary of War, asking for a statement of the condition of the armament of the Forts in the State of Maine, and at Kittery, including the site of the Portsmouth Navy Yard, and the additional armament proposed therefor the present year, has been referred to this office with directions to give the desired information.

In answer I have to state, that the present armament of the Forts mentioned in your letter, consists of 80 pieces of Ordnance of different calibres, from 10 inch guns to 6 pounders, as follows viz: 8 10 inch guns; 2 8 inch guns; 15 42 pounders; 44 24 pounders;

1 12 pounder garrison ; 4 12 pounder howitzers, and 6 6 pounder guns ; and 57 gun carriages of the following calibres, viz : 3 8 inch, 43 24 pounders ; 1 12 pounder garrison ; 4 12 pounder howitzers, and 6 6 pounder guns.

It is proposed to furnish during the present year, in addition to that armament, a sufficient number of carriages to mount all the guns on hand : and also as many guns (with their carriages and ammunition) of the heavier calibres, which these forts are designed to mount, and may be ready to receive, as can be obtained from any and all foundries prepared to make them, and which can be so distributed, consistently with other imperative requirements. It is impossible to say, in view of these contingencies, how many guns and of what particular calibres, will be furnished for these forts ; but there is no doubt that all that can be obtained by the utmost exertion, will be promptly distributed among the different fortifications of our sea-coast so far as to give to each its due proportion.

Respectfully, your obd't serv't,

JAS. W. RIPLEY, *Brig. Gen'l Ch'f Ordn.*

P. S.—In accordance with your verbal request to be informed as to the several forts where the armament before stated is, I have to state as follows, viz :—

Guns now at	10-inch.	8-inch.	42-pd'r.	24-pd'r.	12-pd'r. Garn.	12-pd'r. How.	6-pd'r guns.
Fort Sullivan, . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
“ Preble, . . .	—	2	15	24	1	2	2
“ Gorges, . .	8	—	—	—	—	—	—
“ Constitution,	—	—	—	20	—	2	2
Total, . . .	8	2	15	44	1	4	6
Carriages now at							
Fort Sullivan, . .	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
“ Preble, . . .	—	3	—	23	1	2	2
“ Constitution,	—	—	—	20	—	2	2
Total, . . .	—	3	—	43	1	4	6
Additional carriages required to mount all guns now at							
Fort Gorges, . .	8 10-inch.		—		—		—
“ Preble, . . .	—		15 42-pd'rs.		1 24-pd'r.		—
Total, . . .	8 10-inch.		15 42-pd'r's.		1 24-pd'r.		—

JAS. W. R.

In view of former requisitions for ordnance disregarded, and of past pledges still unfilled ; and in justice to the obvious demands of Maine on the general government, the authorities of the State will no doubt adopt such measures, for her protection, as may be

due to her position as a member of the federal Union, consistent with a proper respect for her own rights as a State.

The territory now included within the State of Maine, was the prize for which the great European States contended,—as it was the theatre of the earliest conflict between France and England, which caused the effusion of blood.

In later times her people suffered from Indian cruelties and the horrors of border warfare, and all the evils resulting from disquieted homes, from fears excited by the dread of foreign invasion.

After the French power was subdued, and after our boundaries were established by the treaty of 1783, a new demand was made on Maine to surrender a most valuable portion of her territory, and indispensable as a means of public defence, for the purpose of rounding off the British Colonial Empire of North America. Under a threat of still greater wrongs, in case she was recusant to the demands of power, for the opening up to the use of British troops a line of communication between the Upper and Lower British Provinces across her ancient borders, Maine yielded a reluctant compliance. For this she has been rewarded with neglect and indifference on the part of the federal government.

While the forts at Charleston, at Savannah, at Mobile and New Orleans, have been steadily advanced to completion, there was no lack of ordnance for the armament of forts Sumter, Macon, Pulaski and Morgan, while the forts in Maine, and the navy yard at Portsmouth were left defenceless. The same influence guides the distribution of ordnance now, as in former days.

But when the call to duty came, instead of repaying the federal government in kind, Maine was a foremost State in the Union in discharge of its duty to the national cause. So deep was the conviction in the minds of her people, in favor of republican institutions, and so thorough was their devotion to the Union, that on the first outbreak against the life of the nation, her sons went forth to battle in her cause. Their blood has stained every field, from Manassas to New Orleans, and the ships of our navy bear no nobler hearts than those who claim parentage in Maine.

The federal government, it may be hoped, will yet realize that Maine has a just claim for her protection.

With the highest consideration, I have the honor to be
Your Excellency's most obedient servant,

JOHN A. POOR.

WASHINGTON, Dec. 12, 1862.

APPENDIX.

The cost of some of the principal forts to June 30, 1860, is given in the following table:—

Fort Monroe,	Hampton Roads, Va.,	\$2,439,478 84
“ Calhoun,	“ “	1,902,503 38
“ Taylor,	Key West, Florida,	1,246,381 24
“ Jefferson,	“ “	1,274,000 00
“ Pickens,	Pensacola, “	807,681 13
“ McRea,	“ “	453,377 73
“ Barancas,	“ “	531,781 93
“ Morgan,	Mobile, Alabama,	1,253,738 24
“ Gaines,	“	258,500 00
“ Sumter,	Charleston, S. C.,	906,649 10
“ Pulaski,	Savannah, Ga.,	989,499 80
“ Jackson,	“	141,337 24
“ Maco,	Beaufort, N. C.,	466 058 20
“ Caswell,	Cape Fear, “	579,371 68
“ St. Philip’s,	New Orleans, La.,	280,577 34
“ Jackson,	“ “	854,788 89
“ Pike,	“ “	402,707 80
“ Macomb,	“ “	433,656 13
“ Livingston,	“ “	378,111 08
“ Point,	San Francisco,	1,643,833 00
“ Alcatroz,	“	921,863 38
“ Delaware,	Mouth of Delaware River,	1,412,603 64
“ Adams,	Newport, R. I.,	1,721,982 61
“ Warren,	Boston,	1,207,498 52
“ Indep’d’ce,	“	504,916 62
“ Govr’s Isl’d,	“	162,449 77
“ Schuyler,	East River, N. Y.,	921,877 33
“ Hamilton,	Narrows, “	639,327 08
“ Lafayette,	“ “	349,263 82
“ Richmond,	Staten Island,	562,398 80
“ Tompkins,	“	211,000 00
Other forts around New York,		832,078 98

The following sums have been expended on navy yards :—

At New York,	\$6,088,894	24
“ Norfolk,	4,741,961	98
“ Pensacola,	3,910,241	91
“ Boston,	3,790,143	95
“ San Francisco,	3,297,065	96
“ Portsmouth,	2,095,373	73
“ Philadelphia,	1,632,472	41

For armories, the following sums :—

Springfield armory, Mass.,	\$1,490,000	00
Harper’s Ferry armory,	1,808,201	76

Custom Houses :—

New Orleans,	\$3,012,617	11
Charleston,	2,062,250	45
New York,	1,105,313	57
Boston,	1,106,658	00
San Francisco,	757,456	68

Arsenals :—

Kennebec, Augusta, Me.,	\$265,846	91
Watertown, Mass.,	320,281	92
Watervilet, N. Y.,	671,112	39
New York City, N. Y.,	86,444	73
Alleghany, Pa.,	471,318	02
Frankford, Pa.,	209,563	90
Pikesville, Md.,	115,711	94
Fort Monroe, Va.,	151,949	51
Bellum, Va.,	192,825	81
North Carolina,	338,079	28
Charleston,	131,181	39
Augusta, Georgia,	265,495	39
Apalachicola, Florida,	253,416	94
Texas,	28,100	04
St. Louis,	394,667	15
Missouri,	36,416	34
Detroit,	153,114	28
Benicia,	268,960	84
Military Academy, West Point,	965,412	88
Naval School, Annapolis,	609,924	18

STATE OF MAINE.

IN HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, }
January 14, 1863. }

On motion of Mr. WARREN of Veazie, laid upon the table, and
350 copies ordered to be printed for the use of the Legislature.

CHARLES A. MILLER, *Clerk.*

IN SENATE, January 17, 1863.

On motion of Mr. BARROWS of Oxford,
Ordered, That 500 additional copies of the Report of Hon. John
A. Poor, on the Defences of Maine, be printed for the use of the
Legislature.

EZRA C. BRETT, *Secretary.*