



116th MAINE LEGISLATURE

SECOND REGULAR SESSION-1994

Legislative Document

No. 1819

H.P. 1353

House of Representatives, February 1, 1994

An Act to Clarify the Sentencing Laws in Maine.

Approved for introduction by a majority of the Legislative Council pursuant to Joint Rule 26. Reference to the Committee on Judiciary suggested and ordered printed.

∕JOSEPH W. MAYO, Clerk

Presented by Representative PARADIS of Augusta.

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows:

Sec. 1. 15 MRSA §2151, as enacted by PL 1989, c. 218, §5, is amended to read:

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§2151. Application to the Supreme Judicial Court by defendant for review of certain sentences

In cases arising in the District Court or the Superior Court in which a defendant has been convicted of a criminal offense and sentenced to a term of imprisonment of one year or more, the <u>District Attorney, Attorney General or</u> defendant may, except in any case in which a different term of imprisonment could not have been imposed, apply to the Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, for review of the sentence.

Sec. 2. 15 MRSA $\S2155$, sub- $\S1$, as amended by PL 1991, c. 525, $\S2$, is further amended to read:

1. Propriety of sentence. The propriety of the sentence, 20 having regard to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, the protection of the public interest, the effect of 22 the offense on the victim and any other relevant sentencing factors recognized under law. The Supreme Judicial Court may not 24 establish any one sentencing factor or criteria as controlling, 26 to the exclusion of other relevant sentencing factors. The Supreme Judicial Court may not otherwise promote a formulistic 28 approach to sentencing that would diminish the appropriate differentiation among offenders and the just individualization of 30 sentencing; and

Sec. 3. 15 MRSA §2155-A is enacted to read:

\$2155-A. Standard of review by the Supreme Judicial Court

36 The standard of review to be used by the Supreme Judicial Court under this chapter is to determine whether the sentencing 38 judge or justice committed an abuse of discretion in imposing the sentence that is being reviewed.

Sec. 4. 15 MRSA §2156, sub-§1-A, as enacted by PL 1991, c. 525, §4, is amended to read:

44 1-A. Remand. If the Supreme Judicial Court determines that relief should be granted, it must remand the case to the court 46 that imposed the sentence for any further proceedings that could have been conducted prior to the imposition of the sentence under 48 review and for resentencing on the basis of such further proceedings previded-that-the-sentence-is-not-mere-severe-than 50 the-sentence-appealed.

Sec. 5. 17-A MRSA §1152, sub-§§2-C and 2-D are enacted to read:

2-C. Full range of sentencing options. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this code, the full range of sentencing options provided for by this Part, including periods of imprisonment up to and including the maximum periods as established by section 1252, are available for imposition by a sentencing court for any criminal offense within a sentencing classification. A court may not establish or follow any additional or different system of classification of offenses for sentencing purposes, such as a tiered system.

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14 <u>2-D. Reservation of ranges impermissible. Except as otherwise specifically provided in this code, a court may not reserve sentences of imprisonment, whether suspended or unsuspended, up to and including the statutorily specified 18 maximum for each classification of offense, for a specific type or manner of committing an offense within a sentencing 20 classification. Sentences of imprisonment must be imposed by the sentencing court in a manner consistent with the purposes of 22 sentencing as established by this chapter.</u>

STATEMENT OF FACT

In 1988, the 113th Legislature enacted Public Law 1987, chapter 808, which, as amended, doubled the maximum imprisonment penalty for Class A crimes from 20 years to 40 years.

32 The purpose of the 1988 changes was to increase the range of periods of incarceration available to sentencing courts without 34 imposing minimum mandatory sentences. The purpose was to allow judges to address a perceived increase in the seriousness of 36 criminal acts being committed upon the citizens of the State. 38 The intent of the law was to give the sentencing judges an 38 ability to impose longer sentences upon career criminals and particularly violent criminals.

In a series of decisions, <u>State v. Lewis</u>, 590 A.2d 149 (1991), <u>State v. Gosselin</u>, 600 A.2d 1108 (1991), <u>State v.</u> <u>Michaud</u>, 590 A.2d 538 (1991) and <u>State v. Hewey</u>, 622 A.2d 1151 (1993), the Maine Supreme Judicial Court misinterpreted the intent of the legislation passed in 1988 and created a 2-tiered system of punishments for Class A crimes. The effect of these decisions has been to reduce the availability of meaningful sentences for career criminals and violent criminals.

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The intent of this bill is to restore the original full range of sentencing options to the sentencing courts and to 2 establish a standard of appellate review that is limited to a 4 review for an abuse of discretion by the original sentencing judges. In addition, the Appellate Court in reviewing sentences is given the right to review sentences upon appeal by the State. б This portion of the bill is intended to decrease the degree of inequality in sentences by allowing the reviewing court to 8 consider both types of improper sentences when a lower court has abused its discretion by imposing an illegal sentence or an 10 inappropriate sentence.

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This document has not yet been reviewed to determine the need for cross-reference, stylistic and other technical amendments to conform existing law to current drafting standards.

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