MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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1 2	FIRST REGULAR SESSION								
3 4	ONE HUNDRED AND ELEVENTH LEGISLATURE								
5 6	Legislative Document No. 147								
7 8 9	H.P. 1115 Referred to the Committee on Judiciary. Sent up for concurrence and ordered printed. EDWIN H. PERT, Cl.								
11	Presented by Representative Connolly of Portland.								
12 13	STATE OF MAINE								
14 15 16	IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD NINETEEN HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THREE								
17 18 19	AN ACT Repealing the Law on the Effect of Bail Following Conviction and Commitment.								
20 21	Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows:								
22 23	15 MRSA §1701, as repealed and replaced by PL 1965, c. 356, §54, is repealed.								
24	STATEMENT OF FACT								
25 26 27 28	The purpose of this bill is to eliminate the unfairness a person sentenced to a period of incarceration faces in deciding whether to seek bail while he appeals his conviction.								
29 30	Currently, a person who actually serves some time after being sentenced cannot have that time credited								

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to his sentence if he succeeds in getting released on bail pending appeal. This denial of credit is the only situation under Maine law where time spent in custody is not credited to the sentence. A more detailed analysis follows.

Presently, Title 15, section 1701, addresses calculation of the period of imprisonment pending a direct appeal to the Maine Law Court where a defendant has been bailed after having been in active execution of some portion of his sentence of imprisonment. More specifically, section 1701 mandates that:

If a defendant is committed in execution of his sentence and is thereafter admitted to bail pending appeal, this admission to bail vacates the effect of the original commitment and the entire sentence will commence to run from the date of the commitment after final decision. Thus, if a defendant has served 30 days on his sentence before being admitted to bail pending appeal, if the judgment is affirmed and he is again committed, he receives no credit for the 30 days he originally served.

3 Glassman, <u>Maine Practice: Rules of Criminal Procedure Annotated section 38.1 at 326 (1967).</u>

The proposed elimination of Title 15, section 1701, has the following bipartite impetus.

First, although the denial of credit for time actually served in execution of a sentence in exchange for securing conditional freedom (following a judgment of conviction) while awaiting the outcome of a direct appeal may well have reflected a legitimate legislative objective at the time of its initial legislative appearance in 1905 (Public Law 1905, chapter 106), presently this trade-off serves no apparent public purpose. It is, in fact, directly at odds both with the punishment provisions of the Maine Criminal Code (Title 17-A, Pt. 3) which do not countenance any form of "dead time" or even the withdrawal of "good time" (Title 17-A, section 1253, subsections 3, 3-A and 3-B) or "extra good time", Title 17-A, section 1253, absent prisoner misbehavior Title

17-A, section 1253, subsection 5, and with the statutory provisions addressing credit for time served either pre-trial (Title 17-A, section 1253, subsection 2) or in a post-conviction review proceeding (Title 17-A, section 1701) which do not deny credit for time actually served if bail is secured pending a direct appeal. Indeed, it is viewed by the criminal justice system as so unfair that section 1701 is wholly ignored.

Second, the denial of credit for time acutally served in execution of a sentence in exchange for securing conditional freedom (following a judgment of conviction) while awaiting the outcome of a direct appeal is of questionable constitutional validity. Specifically, this trade-off may, inter alia:

- (a) Constitute a multiple punishment for the same offense in violation of the constitutional guarantees against double jeopardy (cf. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 United States 711, 717-19 (1969); State v. Howes, 432 A. 2d 419, 423 (Me. 1981);
- (b) Constitute, in certain cases (depending upon the sentence actually imposed and the amount of time spent in execution of such sentence prior to being admitted to bail), an over-the-statutory maximum imprisonment for the particular underlying crime in violation of fundamental notions of due process;
 - (c) Constitute given the absence of such denial of credit both in a post-conviction review proceeding (Title 15, section 1701) and for pre-trial detention time (Title 17-A, section 1253, subsection 2), whether pending trial or an interlocutory appeal an irrational, arbitrary and, therefore, invidious discrimination in violation of equal protection of the law's guarantees; and
 - (d) Constitute, in certain cases (depending upon the sentence actually imposed and the amount of time spent in execution of such sentence prior to being admitted to bail) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the constitutional guaran-

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