MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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Leg	islative Docu	ıment						No.	1360
H.P	. 1035			Ho	use of F	Represer	ıtatives,	March 29,	1983
orde	Referred to the red printed.	he Comn	nittee on	Judio	ciary. Se	ent up f	or conci	urrence and	i
						E	DWIN I	H. PERT,	Clerk
Pres	ented by Repr Cosponsor: R								
			STATE	E OF	MAIN	E			
	NI		THE YE					2	
	AN A		Amend Maine					of	
	it enacted lows:	d by t	he Pec	ple	of the	he St	ate of	Maine	as
PL rea		17-A . 677	MRSA § , §§2	15, and	sub-	§1, ¶ is fu	A, as rther	amended amended	by to
	A. Any photosetel		who				oable tting:		to
	(1)	Murd	er;						
	(2)	Any	Class	s A,	Clas	s B o	r Clas	s C cri	me;
	(3)	Assa	ult wh	nile	hunt	ing;			

1	(4) Any offense defined in chapter 45;
2 3 4	(5) Assault, if the officer reasonably believes that the person may cause injury to others unless immediately arrested;
5	(5-A) Assault, criminal threatening, terrorizing or reckless conduct, if the
6	
7	officer reasonably believes that the person
8	and the victim are family or household mem-
9	bers, as defined in Title 15, section 301
LO	This subparagraph is repealed on November 1-
11	1983;
L 2	(6) Theft as defined in section 357, when
L3	the value of the services is \$1,000 or less,
L 4	if the officer reasonably believes that the
15	person will not be apprehended unless
L6	<pre>immediately arrested;</pre>
۱7	(7) Forgery, if the officer reasonably
18	believes that the person will not be appre-
L9	hended unless immediately arrested; or
20	(8) Negotiating a worthless instrument, if
21	the officer reasonably believes that the
22	person will not be apprehended unless
23	immediately arrested; and
24 25	<pre>Sec. 2. 17-A MRSA §201, sub-§1-A is enacted to read:</pre>
26	1-A. For purposes of subsection 1, paragraph B,
27	"conduct which manifests a depraved indifference to
28	the value of human life" has the following meaning:
29	A. A person engages in conduct which manifests a
30	depraved indifference to the value of human life
31	when:
32	(1) Either he knows that there is a very
33	high degree of risk that his conduct will
34	cause death or serious bodily injury, or a
35	reasonable and prudent person in his situa-
36	tion would know of that risk and

1	(2) His conduct, when viewed in light of
2	the totality of the circumstances, reflects
3	that an indifference to the value of human
	life that it would be generally regarded by
5	mankind as depraved.

- As used in subparagraph (2) "totality of the circumstances" means the nature and purpose of the actor's conduct, the circumstances known to the actor and the circumstances which would have been apparent to a reasonable and prudent person in the actor's situation. "Depraved" means outrageous, revolting, savage, brutal or shocking, readily demonstrating an almost total lack of concern or appreciation for the value of human life.
- - 2-A. In a prosecution under subsection 1, paragraph A, evidence that the allegedly false testimony or statement in the prior official proceeding or before a notary or other person authorized to administer oaths was contradicted by evidence in that proceeding may not be a sufficient basis by itself to sustain a conviction for false swearing.
- 24 Sec. 4. 17-A MRSA §802, sub-§1, ¶B, as enacted 25 by PL 1975, c. 499, §1, is amended to read:
- 26 B. On his own property or the property of another
 - (1) with the intent to enable any person to collect insurance proceeds for the loss caused by the fire or explosion; or
 - (2) in conscious disregard of a substantial risk that his conduct will endanger any person or damage or destroy the property of another which recklessly endangers any person or the property of another.
- 36 Sec. 5. 17-A MRSA §1206, sub-§5, as repealed and replaced by PL 1977, c. 510, §73, is amended to read:

alleged violation constitutes When the for which the person on probation has not been convicted, the court may revoke probation if it finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person on probation committed the crime. If the person subsequently convicted of the crime, or any other crime or crimes arising out of the same conduct, sentencing shall be subject to the requirements section 1155 1256. If concurrent terms of imprisonment are imposed and the terms do not commence on the same date, any time served as a result of the probation revocation shall be deducted from the time the person is required to serve as a result of the conviction.

- Sec. 6. 17-A MRSA §1206, sub-§6, as repealed and replaced by PL 1977, c. 510, §73, is repealed.
- Sec. 7. 17-A MRSA §1206, sub-§7, as amended by
 PL 1979, c. 512, §42, is further amended to read:
 - 7. If a person on probation is convicted of a new crime during the period of probation, the court may sentence him for such crime and revoke probation. If the person has been sentenced for the new crime and probation revocation proceedings are subsequently commenced, the court which conducts the revocation hearing may revoke probation. Sentencing for the multiple offenses shall be subject to section \(\frac{1}{255}\) \(\frac{1256}{205}\). If concurrent terms of imprisonment are imposed and the terms do not commence on the same date, any time served as a result of the new conviction shall be deducted from the time the person is required to serve as a result of the probation revocation.
- 32 Sec. 8. 17-A MRSA §1206, sub-§7-A, as enacted by 33 PL 1979, c. 512, §43, is amended to read:
 - 7-A. Upon revocation of probation pursuant to subsections subsection 5, 6 or 7, the court may impose all of the sentence which was suspended when probation was granted or it may impose a portion thereof vacate, in whole or in part, the suspension of execution as to imprisonment or fine specified when probation was granted, considering the nature of the violation and the reasons for granting probation. The remaining portion of the sentence for which sus-

- 1 pension of execution is not imposed vacated upon 2 revocation of probation shall remain suspended and 3 subject to revocation at a later date. During 4 service of the that portion of the sentence imposed 5 for which the suspension of execution was vacated 6 upon revocation, the running of the period of proba-7 tion shall be interrupted and shall resume again upon 8 release. The court may nevertheless revoke probation 9 impose vacate the suspension of execution as to 10 the remainder of the suspended sentence or a portion 11 thereof for any criminal conduct committed during the 12 service of the that portion imposed of the sentence 13 for which the suspension of execution was vacated 14 upon revocation.

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- 8. Whenever a person is detained in any state or county institution pending a probation revocation proceeding, such period of detention shall be deducted from the time the person is required to serve under the sentence imposed that portion of the sentence for which the suspension of execution was vacated as a result of the probation revocation.
- 24 Sec. 10. 17-A MRSA §1253, sub-§2, as amended by 25 PL 1977, c. 671, §31, is further amended to read:
 - 2. When a person sentenced to imprisonment has previously been detained to await trial, in any state or county institution, or local lock-up, for the conduct for which such the sentence is imposed, such the period of detention shall be deducted from the time he is required to be imprisoned under such that sentence. The attorney representing the State shall furnish the court, at the time of sentence, a statement showing the length of such that detention, and the statement shall be attached to the official records of the commitment.
- When a person sentenced to imprisonment is detained at a county jail or other place of detention by virtue of that commitment either to await transportation to the place of imprisonment specified by the sentence of the court, or pursuant to court order, the period of detention shall be deducted from the

time he is required to be imprisoned under that sen-tence. The sheriff or other person upon whom the legal duty is imposed to deliver that sentenced person, shall, at the time of the delivery, furnish to the department a statement showing the length of that detention. In addition, the transporter shall, without needless delay, furnish to the sentencing court the same statement and that statement shall be attached to the official records of the commitment.

10 STATEMENT OF FACT

Section 1 corrects an inconsistency created when the "sunset provision" to "An Act Concerning Abuse Between Family or Household Members," namely, Title 19, section, 770-A, as reallocated by Public Law 1981, chapter 470, Part A, section 46, was repealed by Public Law 1982, chapter 554.

Section 2 defines "conduct which manifests a depraved indifference to the value of human life" as set forth in Title 17-A, section 201, subsection 1, paragraph B and as construed by the Maine Law Court in State v. Joy, 452 A.2d 408, 409-12 (Me. 1982); State v. Crocker, 435 A.2d 58, 62-8 (Me. 1981); State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 540 (Me. 1980); State v. Goodall, 407 A.2d 268, 288 n. 18 (Me. 1979); and State v. Woodbury, 403 A.2d 1166, 1171-72 (Me.1979).

Section 4 corrects an inconsistency created when the Maine Criminal Code definition of "recklessly" was amended as to form by Public Law 1977, chapter 510, sections 20 and 21. State v. Barrett, 408 A.2d 1273, 1278-79 (Me. 1979).

Sections 5 and 6 correct an inconsistency created when Title 17-A, section 1155 was reallocated to Title 17-A, section 1256 by Public Law 1981, chapter 324, sections 29 and 34.

35 Section 7 eliminates the 2nd sentence of Title 36 17-A, section 1206, subsection 6 as unnecessary in 37 light of Title 17-A, section 1206, subsection 7-A.

Sections 8 and 9 eliminate the use of the term, "impose" and forms thereof-i.e. "imposed," relative

to the vacating of all or a portion of a suspension following revocation of probation pursuant to 17-A, section 1206, subsections 7-A and 8. The use of the term "impose" in the context of a probation revocation as reflected in subsections 7-A and 8 is at best confusing and, at worst, erroneous. As technical matter, following the revocation of probation, a court simply rescinds a preexisting suspension order; it does not at that point in time "impose" a sentence. This is so because the imposition of sentence, as a matter of law, occurred at an earlier point in time, to wit, at the time person was adjudicated quilty of the offense for which he was convicted. (Title 17-A, sections 1201 1204; M.R.Crim.P. 32). By stating that a court "imposes" a sentence upon revocation of probation, certain persons may be mislead into assuming that they thereby possess a renewed right of access to appellate review of sentence pursuant to Title 15, sections 2141 to 2144 and M.R.Crim.P. 40.

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Section 10 corrects an omission relative to Title 17-A, section 1253. Presently, section 1253 addresses calculation of the period of imprisonment once execution has commenced, subsections 1, 3, 3-A, 3-B, 4 and 5, and calculation of the period of imprisonment prior to a sentence being imposed, subsection 2. Unlike one of its statutory precursors namely, Title 15, section 1701-A, repealed by Public Law 1975, chapter 499, section 2, no consideration is given to calculation of the period of imprisonment following a sentence but prior to the actual commencement thereof in section $12\overline{53}$. The omission was not by design, "dead-time" being contemplated by the Maine form of Criminal Code. Section 10 amends section 1253 cifically to address post-sentence detention resulting either because immediate transportation place of imprisonment specified by the sentence of the court does not take place or because transportation is delayed pursuant to a court order-e.g., pending court action on an application for bail pending appeal.