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May 7, 1981

Honorable Judy Kany House of Representatives State House Augusta, Maine 04333

Dear Representative Kany:

You have asked whether art. V, pt. 1, § 8 of the Maine Constitution requires a two-thirds vote for the enactment of legislation which would change the joint standing committee responsible for recommending to the Senate whether prospective appointees to the State Personnel Board should be confirmed. It is our opinion that such legislation would require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of each House present and voting.

Art. V, pt. 1, § 8 provides, in relevant part, as follows:

§8. To appoint officers

Section 8. He [the Governor] shall nominate, and, subject to confirmation as provided herein, appoint all judicial officers except judges of probate and justices of the peace if their manner of selection is otherwise provided for by this Constitution or by law, and all other civil and military officers whose appointment is not by this Constitution, or shall not by law be otherwise provided for.

The procedure for confirmation shall be as follows: an appropriate legislative committee comprised of members of both houses in reasonable proportion to their membership as provided by law shall recommend confirmation or denial by majority vote of committee members present and voting. The committee recommendation shall be reviewed by the Senate and upon review shall become final action

1/ We understand your question is prompted by L.D. 1566 of the ll0th Legislature, section 4 of which would, among other things, substitute the Joint Standing Committee on State Government for the Joint Standing Committee on Labor as the body empowered to review gubernatorial appointments to the State Personnel Board. The conclusions expressed in this opinion apply only to that change and not to other provisions in the bill. of confirmation or denial unless the Senate by vote of two thirds of those members present and voting overrides the committee recommendation. The Senate vote shall be by the yeas and nays.

All statutes enacted to carry out the purposes
of the second paragraph of this section shall re-
quire the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the
members of each House present and voting.
(Emphasis added)

As is readily apparent, the critical question is whether the legislation which prompted your inquiry would constitute a statute "enacted to carry out the purposes" of the second paragraph of section 8. Guided by the maxim that unambiguous language in a constitutional provision should be read in accordance with its plain meaning, we think it clear that an act which assigns to a legislative committee the confirmation power for particular civil officers is one which is enacted to carry out the purposes described above. Furthermore, we can see no reason why this conclusion should not apply when legislation is enacted to change the committee so empowered. Thus, a literal reading of section 8 leads to the conclusion that the contemplated change requires the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of each House present and voting.

Our interpretation of section 8 is supported by the legislative history underlying the passage of the constitutional resolution which, upon its approval by the electors, established the appointment and confirmation process currently found in section 8.27 This process was created as part of a broader constitutional amendment eliminating the Executive Council. The legislative debate suggests that while there was rather widespread support for the abolition of the Council, there was considerable disagreement as to the entity or entities which should inherit the Council's power to approve civil officers. In fact, the procedure ultimately adopted was the recommendation of a second conference committee appointed to resolve the differences between the House and the Senate after the latter body had rejected the report of the first such committee.<sup>4</sup>

- 2/ The current provisions in section 8 were adopted pursuant to Chapter 4 of the Constitutional Resolutions of 1975, with minor changes made by Chapter 4 of the Constitutional Resolutions of 1979.
- 3/ This disagreement is evidenced by the fact that the bill proposing the constitutional amendment, L.D. 24 of the 107th Legislature, was reported out of the State Government Committee with four different reports. Three of those reports recommended passage but contained different confirmation procedures. The fourth opposed passage.
- 4/ L.D. 24 was ultimately passed as amended by Conference Committee Amendment "A", S-381 of the 107th Legislature. The first conference committee had recommended passage of one of the reports of the State Government Committee.

When the amendment proposed by the second conference committee was put before the House, Representative DeVane specifically asked how the responsibility for holding confirmation hearings and making recommendations to the Senate would be assigned to the various legislative committees. The response of Representative Tierney, a member of the second conference committee, is particularly relevant to your inquiry.

> MR. TIERNEY: . . . The answer to the gentleman's . . . question as to the final arbiter of the appropriate committee is that the Legislature itself is the final arbiter of the appropriate committee, because all of this constitutional provision would have to be supplemented by enabling legislation which, under the terms of this section of the Constitution, must be passed by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of the Legislature. Again, the final arbiter of which appropriate committee would hear which particular nominee shall be set by statute by a two-thirds vote of both Houses of the legislature.

Representative Tierney's remarks leave no doubt that it was the intent of the framers of the constitutional amendment that the creation or designation of a committee to review particular gubernatorial appointments would require a two-thirds vote.

The relevant legislative history also supports our conclusion that a two-thirds vote is needed to transfer the confirmation responsibility from one legislative committee to another. As noted above, the focal point of the disagreement over the abolition of the Executive Council concerned the exercise of the Council's power to approve gubernatorial appointees. Thus, the requirement of a twothirds vote was a central feature of the compromise developed by the second conference committee, insofar as it insured that the allocation of the confirmation power to particular committees would have widespread support in the Legislature. To find the requirement inapplicable to legislation transferring the power from one legislative committee to another would undermine the compromise which was critical to the Legislature's adoption of the resolution to amend art. V, pt. 1, § 8 of the Maine Constitution.<sup>2</sup>/

5/ We would note that in 1980 the third paragraph of art. V, pt. 1, § 8 was amended by Chapter 4 of the Constitutional Resolutions of 1979 which added the language underlined below:

> All statutes enacted to carry out the second paragraph of this section shall require the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of each House present and voting.

Since the second paragraph of section 8 outlines the confirmation procedure, the 1980 amendment serves to reinforce the conclusion reached herein. For the reasons stated above, we conclude that legislation which would change the committee responsible for making recommendations to the Sepate on gubernatorial appointments to the State Personnel Board—must be enacted by the affirmative vote of twothirds of the members of each House present and voting.

I hope this information is helpful.

Sincerely,

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STEPHEN L. DIAMOND Deputy Attorney General

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6/ Implicit in our answer to your question is the conclusion that the members of the State Personnel Board are "civil officers," and thus, their appointments are subject to the provisions of Art. V, pt. 1, § 8. Given the duties of the Board, we do not think it can be reasonably argued that its members are not civil officers. See generally, Advisory Opinion to Senate, 277 A.2d 750, (R.I. 1971).