

MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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REVISED STATUTES
OF THE
STATE OF MAINE
1954

1957 CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

ANNOTATED

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THE MICHIE COMPANY
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Law governing right of inheritance.—The question whether an adopted child (irrespective of where he is adopted) can inherit and the extent of such right of inheritance will be determined, not by the law of the state where the adoption took place, but by the law of the state where the property is located, or by the law of the domicile of the decedent, as the case may be. *New England Trust Co. v. Sanger*, 151 Me. 295, 118 A. (2d) 760.

Legally adopted children are heirs at law of a deceased adopting parent within the meaning of a clause of a will providing for "if any of my said children should die, leaving at the time of such death no lineal descendants, then such part of the trust fund as would have vested in such lineal descendants, had any such existed, shall vest free of any trust in his or her heirs at law." *New England Trust Co. v. Sanger*, 151 Me. 295, 118 A. (2d) 760.

Interpretation of words "child or children," etc.

In accord with 2nd paragraph in original. See *Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Brown*, 152 Me. 360, 131 A. (2d) 191.

Interpretation of the word "issue" in a trust indenture may be due in a large measure to whether the settlor was himself the adopting parent, or whether the word related to adopted children of a beneficiary, since by adoption, adopters can make for themselves an heir, but they cannot thus make one for their kindred. *Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Brown*, 152 Me. 360, 131 A. (2d) 191.

Whether adopted children are "issue" of their adoptive mothers, depends upon the intention of the testator as expressed in the language used in the trust indenture. *Fiduciary Trust Co. v. Brown*, 152 Me. 360, 131 A. (2d) 191.

Chapter 160.

Testamentary Trustees and Voluntary Trusts.

Sections 27-33. The Rule against Perpetuities.

Sections 34-35. Income Earned during Period of Administration.

The Rule against Perpetuities.

Sec. 27. When rule applied.—In applying the rule against perpetuities to an interest in real or personal property limited to take effect at or after the termination of one or more life estates in, or lives of, persons in being when the period of said rule commences to run, the validity of the interest shall be determined on the basis of facts existing at the termination of such one or more life estates or lives. In this section an interest which must terminate not later than the death of one or more persons is a "life estate" even though it may terminate at an earlier time. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 28. Age may be reduced to 21.—If an interest in real or personal property would violate the rule against perpetuities as modified by section 27 because such interest is contingent upon any person attaining or failing to attain an age in excess of 21, the age contingency shall be reduced to 21 as to all persons subject to the same age contingency. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 29. Contingent fees. — A fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land subject to a right of entry for condition broken shall become a fee simple absolute if the specified contingency does not occur within 30 years from the date when such fee simple determinable or such fee simple subject to a right of entry becomes possessory. If such contingency occurs within said 30 years the succeeding interest, which may be an interest in a person other than the person creating the interest or his heirs, shall become possessory or the right of entry exercisable notwithstanding the rule against perpetuities. But if a fee simple determinable in land or a fee simple in land subject to a right of entry for condition broken is so limited that the specified contingency must occur, if at all, within the period of the rule against perpetuities, said interests shall take effect

as limited. This section shall not apply where both such fee simple determinable and such succeeding interest, or both such fee simple and such right of entry are for public, charitable or religious purposes; nor shall it apply to a deed, gift or grant to the state or any political subdivision thereof. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 30. Application of §§ 27-33.—Sections 27 to 33, inclusive, shall apply to both legal and equitable interests. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 31. Limitation of §§ 27-33.—Except as provided in the first sentence of section 29, sections 27 to 33, inclusive, shall not be construed to invalidate or modify the terms of any limitation which would have been valid prior to August 20, 1955. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 32. Severability of §§ 27-33.—If any of the provisions of sections 27 to 33, inclusive, shall be held invalid or unconstitutional in relation to any of the applications thereof, such invalidity or unconstitutionality shall not affect other applications thereof or others of said sections; and to this end sections 27 to 33, inclusive, are declared to be severable. (1955, c. 244.)

Sec. 33. To what instruments effective.—Sections 27 to 33, inclusive, shall apply only to inter vivos instruments taking effect after August 20, 1955, to wills where the testator dies after August 20, 1955, and to appointments made after August 20, 1955, including appointments by inter vivos instruments or wills under powers created before said effective date. (1955, c. 244.)

Income Earned during Period of Administration.

Sec. 34. Income earned during period of administration. — Unless otherwise expressly provided by the will of a testator dying after the effective date of this act, all net income from real and personal property earned during the period of administration of the estate of such testator and not payable to others or otherwise disposed of by the will shall be distributed pro rata to or for the benefit of the immediate income beneficiaries of any trusts created out of the residuary estate of such testator and the other persons entitled to such residuary estate. None of such income shall, after such distribution, be added to the principal of the residuary estate the whole or any part of which is devised or bequeathed in trust or for life or for a term of years, but shall be paid ratably to the income beneficiary of a trust, or to the tenant for life or for a term of years, or to the absolute residuary distributee, as the case may be. Unless otherwise directed in the will, income shall be payable to the life beneficiaries of trusts, or to life tenants from the date of testator's death. Nothing contained in this section shall affect the right of any person to income on any portion of the estate not part of the residuary estate of such testator. (1957, c. 183.)

Effective date.—The act inserting this section is effective August 28, 1957.

Sec. 35. Net income on general bequest in trust.—Where a general bequest other than of residue is given in trust or for life or for a term of years, that portion of the net income of the estate, except income from assets specifically devised or bequeathed, earned during the period of administration up to the time of distribution of such bequest, computed as hereinafter provided in this section, shall be distributed as income to or for the benefit of the immediate income beneficiary of such bequest. Such portion shall be that proportion of the net income of the estate earned to the time of distribution of such bequest, except income from assets specifically devised or bequeathed, which the value of such bequest bears to the total inventory value of the estate reduced by all debts, expenses and taxes payable out of the residue of the estate; by the amount of

any general bequest other than of residue, which is not given in trust or for life or for a term of years; and by the inventory value of assets specifically devised and bequeathed. (1957, c. 183.)

Chapter 164.

Probate Bonds.

Actions on Bonds.

Sec. 9. Action on administrator's or executor's bond.

It is only when the breach is fraudulently concealed that action may be commenced later than six years from the time of breach of an administrator's or executor's bond, and then it must be commenced within three years from the date of discovery. *Dunton v. Maine Bonding & Casualty Co.*, 150 Me. 205, 107 A. (2d) 776.

Chapter 165.

Actions by or against Executors and Administrators.

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Sec. 9. Actions for injuries causing immediate death.

History of §§ 9 and 10.

152 Me. 257, 127 A. (2d) 490.

It is common knowledge that this and the following section is the Death Statute or Lord Campbell's Act. *Picard v. Libby*,

Allegations of negligence held sufficient.—See *Picard v. Libby*, 152 Me. 257, 127 A. (2d) 490.

Sec. 10. How such action brought; amount recovered, disposed of.

—Every such action shall be brought by and in the names of the personal representatives of such deceased person, and the amount recovered in every such action, except as hereinafter provided, shall be for the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower, if no children, and of the children, if no widow or widower, and if both, then for the exclusive benefit of the widow or widower and the children equally, and, if neither, of his or her heirs. The jury may give such damages as they shall deem a fair and just compensation, not exceeding \$20,000, with reference to the pecuniary injuries resulting from such death to the persons for whose benefit such action is brought, and in addition thereto, shall give such damages as will compensate the estate of such deceased person for reasonable expenses of medical, surgical and hospital care and treatment and for reasonable funeral expenses, provided such action shall be commenced within 2 years after the death of such person. (R. S. c. 152, § 10. 1957, c. 188.)

Effect of amendment.—The 1957 amendment increased the maximum amount of damages which may be given from \$10,000 to \$20,000 in the second sentence.

Section assumes death causes some damages.

In accord with 1st paragraph in original. See *Picard v. Libby*, 152 Me. 257, 127 A. (2d) 490.

Death claim and claim for expenses to be separated.—The usual practice, and the better practice, is to place the death claim for the statutory beneficiaries and the

funeral and other expenses in separate counts. In bringing the action the administrator acts in two capacities—first, as trustee to recover damages for the statutory beneficiaries, and second, as administrator to recover expenses chargeable to the estate. Whether the death claim and expenses are included in one count or are separated in two counts, in either event, the jury must be directed to find and report the damages found in each type of claim. *Picard v. Libby*, 152 Me. 257, 127 A. (2d) 490.