MAINE STATE LEGISLATURE

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	(EMERGENCY) SECOND REGULAR SE							
ONE HUNDRED AND TENTH LEGISLATURE								
Legis	slative Document	No. 2053						
and c	2136 House of Represe Referred to the Committee on Judiciary. Sordered printed. ented by Representative Joyce of Portland. Cosponsors: Senator Devoe of Penobsourke of Camden.	EDWIN H. PERT, Clerk						
	STATE OF MAINE	<u> </u>						
	IN THE YEAR OF OUR NINETEEN HUNDRED AND							
	AN ACT to Clarify the 1981 A Relating to the Operating Under and Habitual Offender	r the Influence						
	Emergency preamble. Whereas, Ac not become effective until 90 c ss enacted as emergencies; and	ts of the Legislature days after adjournment						
the	Whereas, the First Regular Session to the comprehence of the laws for presented to strengthen the laws for presenting of the comprehence of intoxicating liquor of the comprehence of 0.10% from operating managements.	ensive group of Acts eventing persons under or with blood-alcoho						
ship	Whereas, certain amendments are ous matters under the new laws, between the criminal and civil offon of the juvenile court; and	including the relation-						

Whereas, it is essential to the proper enforcement of operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol laws that these be clarified matters quickly as possible; and

Whereas, in the judgment of the Legislature, these facts create an emergency within the meaning of the Constitution of Maine and require the following legislation immediately necessary for the preservation of the public peace, health and safety; now, therefore,

10 Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine as follows:

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11 Sec. 1. 15 MRSA §757, as amended by PL 1979, c. 252, 12 is repealed and the following enacted in its place:

§757. Allegation of prior conviction when sentenced 14 enhanced; procedure

- 1. Allegation required. Except as otherwise provided by law, a prior conviction shall be specially alleged if the sentencing provision of any crime requires that a present sentence be enhanced because the defendant has been previously convicted of a specified crime. A sentence is enhanced within the meaning of this section only if the maximum sentence which may be imposed is increased or a mandatory minimum nonsuspendable sentence must be imposed. The prior conviction may be alleged as part of a count in the complaint, information or indictment alleging the principal offense or may be alleged in an ancillary complaint, information or indictment. An ancillary charging instrument may be filed with the court at any time prior to the imposition of the sentence on the principal offense and sentencing shall be continued until after there has been an opportunity to obtain an indictment if an indictment is required for the allegation of the prior conviction or adjudication.
- 2. Procedure. In a trial to a jury in which the prior conviction is for an offense which is identical to the current principal offense or is sufficiently similar knowledge of the fact that defendant has been convicted of the prior offense may, in the determination of the presiding justice, unduly influence the ability of the jury to deter-mine guilt fairly, the allegation of the prior conviction or adjudication shall not be read to a jury until after conviction of the principal offense, nor shall the defendant be tried on the issue of whether he was previously adjudicated convicted until after conviction of the principal offense, unless the prior conviction has been admitted into

- evidence for another reason. The jury which found the 1 2 defendant guilty of the current principal offense determine whether the defendant was convicted of the prior 3 4 alleged offense unless that jury has been discharged prior 5 to the filing of an ancillary charging instrument.
- Identity. If the name and date of birth of the 6 person charged with the current principal offense same as those of the person who has been convicted or adju-8 dicated of the prior offense, it shall be presumed that 9 person charged with the current principal offense is 10 the same person as that person convicted or adjudicated the 12 prior offense.

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- 13 Sec. 2. 15 MRSA §3103, sub-§1, ¶A, as amended by PL 14 1977, c. 664, §11, is further amended to read:
- 15 A. Conduct which, if committed by an adult, would be defined as criminal by Title 17-A, the Maine Criminal 16 17 Code, or by any other criminal statute outside that code, including any rule or regulation under a statute, 18 19 except for those provisions of Titles 12 and 29, not 20 specifically included in paragraph paragraphs E and F;
- 21 Sec. 3. 15 MRSA §3103, sub-§1, ¶D, as amended by PL 22 1979, c. 681, §6, is further amended to read:
- 23 D. If a juvenile is adjudicated to have committed action described in paragraph B or C, willful refusal 24 25 to pay a resulting fine or willful violation 26 terms of a resulting probation; and
- 27 Sec. 4. 15 MRSA §3103, sub-§1, ¶E, as amended by PL 28 1979, c. 663, §116, is further amended to read:
- 29 E. Offenses involving the operation or attempted oper-30 ation of any motor vehicle, a snowmobile or watercraft while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs, as defined in Title 29, section 1312, and in 31 32 Title 12, section 2073, subsection 2, and section 7827, 33 34 subsection 9, respectively.; and
- 35 Sec. 5. 15 MRSA §3103, sub-§1, ¶F is enacted to read:
- 36 F. The criminal violation of operating a motor vehicle 37 under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs 38 excessive blood-alcohol level, as defined an 39 Title 29, section 1312-B.
- 40 Sec. 6. 15 MRSA §3301, sub-§1, ¶B, as amended by PL 41 1981, c. 204, §1, is further amended to read:

B. Make whatever informal adjustment is practicable without a petition, provided that this paragraph does not apply when the juvenile is accused of having committed a juvenile crime pursuant to section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph E; or

Sec. 7. 15 MRSA §3301, sub-§7 is enacted to read:

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- 7. Nonapplication of section. The provisions of this section do not apply to a juvenile charged with the juvenile crime defined in section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F, and a petition may be filed without recommendation by an intake worker. The provisions of section 3203 apply in the case of a juvenile charged with the juvenile crime defined in section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F.
- 14 Sec. 8. 15 MRSA §3308, sub-§6, 2nd ¶, as enacted by PL 15 1981, c. 204, §2, is amended to read:
 - Nothing in this Part may be construed to limit the authority of the Secretary of State, pursuant to Title 29, section 1312, to suspend a person's license or permit and privilege to operate a motor vehicle, right to operate a motor vehicle or right to apply for or obtain a license.

21 Sec. 9. 15 MRSA §3314, sub-§3 is enacted to read:

- 3. Disposition for violation of section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F. When a juvenile has been adjudicated as having committed the juvenile crime under section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F, the court may impose any of the dispositional alternatives contained in subsection 1. Any incarceration which is imposed may be part of a disposition pursuant to subsection 1, paragraph F or H, or may be independent of subsection 1. Any incarceration in a county jail shall be in a county jail designated by the Department of Corrections as a place for the secure detention of niles. In addition, the juvenile's license or permit to operate a motor vehicle, right to operate a motor vehicle or right to apply for or obtain a license shall be suspended by the court for a period of 180 days. The period of suspension shall not be suspended by the court. The court shall give notice of the suspension and take physical custody of an operator's license or permit as provided in Title 29, section 2241-H. The court shall immediately transmit a certified abstract of the suspension to the Secretary of State. A further suspension may be imposed by the Secretary of State pursuant to Title 29, section 1312-D, subsection 1-A.
- 43 Sec. 10. 29 MRSA §58, as last amended by PL 1977, c. 44 184, §2, is further amended to read:

1 §58. Certificate as evidence

Notwithstanding any other provision of law or rule of evidence, the certificate of the Secretary of State or his deputy, under seal of the State, shall be received in any court in this State as prima facie evidence of the issuance, suspension or revocation of any operator's license or any certificate of registration of any vehicle any fact stated in the certificate or documents attached thereto.

9 Sec. 11. 29 MRSA §59, as amended by PL 1971, c. 360, 10 §6, is further amended to read:

§59. Facsimile signature of Secretary of State

A facsimile of the signature of the Secretary of State imprinted by or at his direction upon any precept on any certificate described in section 58 or on any notice to suspend or revoke any certificate of registration or any license issued to any person to operate a motor vehicle shall have the same validity as his written signature and shall be admissible in court.

19 Sec. 12. 29 MRSA §1312, first ¶, as amended by PL 20 1981, c. 475, §2, is further amended to read:

Any person who operates or attempts to operate a motor vehicle within this State shall be deemed to have given consent have the duty to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath, if there is probable cause to believe he has operated or attempted to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. The duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test includes the duty to complete either a blood or breath test.

- 30 Sec. 13. 29 MRSA §1312, 2nd ¶, 2nd sentence, as 31 enacted by PL 1971, c. 547, is amended to read:
- 32 At his the request of a person selecting a blood test, the 33 he may have a test of his blood may be administered by a 34 physician of his choice, if reasonably available.
- 35 Sec. 14. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§1, first sentence, as 36 amended by PL 1981, c. 468, §5, is further amended to read:
- 37 Before any test specified is given, the law enforcement 38 officer shall inform the person as to whom there is probable 39 cause and who is arrested or summonsed that, if he revokes 40 his implied consent fails to comply with the duty to submit

to <u>and complete</u> a chemical test by refusing to permit a test to determine the level of blood-alcohol at the direction of the law enforcement officer, his license or permit to operate, his right to operate or his right to apply for or obtain a license will be suspended for 180 days, and the revocation of consent failure to comply with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test shall be admissible in evidence against him at any trial for operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor.

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45 46 Sec. 15. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§2, first ¶, as repealed and replaced by PL 1981, c. 468, §6, is amended to read:

If a person as to whom there is probable cause revokes his implied consent to a chemical test by refusing upon the request of a law enforcement officer fails to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath upon the request of a law enforcement officer, no test may be given. The Secretary of State, upon the receipt of a written statement under oath from a law enforcement officer, stating that the officer had probable cause to believe that a person was operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating and that the person had revoked his consent by refusing failed to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical test determine the blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath, shall immediately notify the person, in writing, as provided in section 2241, that his license or permit, and his privilege right to operate and his right to apply for or obtain a license have been suspended. The suspension shall be for a period of 180 days. The written statement shall be sent to the Secretary of State within 72 hours of the revocation of consent failure to comply with the duty to submit to the blood-alcohol test, excluding Saturdays, Sundays and holidays. If the statement is not sent within this time period, it shall not affect the Secretary of State's authority to suspend a person's license State shall nevertheless impose the suspension for revoking his prior implied consent by refusing failing to comply with the duty to submit to a test, unless the delay has prejudiced the person's ability to prepare or participate in the hearing described in this subsection.

42 Sec. 16. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§2, 3rd and 4th ¶¶, as 43 amended by PL 1981, c. 475, §4, are amended to read:

The scope of such a hearing shall cover whether there was probable cause to believe that the individual was either attempting to operate or was operating under the influence

of intoxicating liquor and whether he revoked his prior implied consent by refusing failed to comply with the duty to submit to one of the blood-alcohol tests upon the request of a law enforcement officer. Any suspension in shall be removed if, after hearing, it is determined that the person who refused to permit failed to submit to the test would not have refused failed to submit but for the failure of the law enforcement officer to give either both of the warnings required by subsection 1.

If it is determined, after hearing when such is requested, that there was not probable cause to believe that such person was either attempting to operate or was operating under the influence of intoxicating liquor or that the person did not revoke his implied consent to permit fail to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical blood-alcohol test to determine his blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath, any suspension in effect shall be removed immediately.

 Sec. 17. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§3, first sentence, as amended by PL 1981, c. 475, §5, is further amended to read:

Any person, whose license, permit or privilege right to operate or right to apply for or obtain a license is suspended for revoking his implied consent failing to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical test to determine his blood-alcohol level by analysis of his blood or breath at the direction of a law enforcement officer claiming to have had probable cause to believe that the person operated or attempted to operate while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, shall have the right to file a petition in the Superior Court in the county where he resides, or in Kennebec County, to review the order of suspension by the Secretary of State by the same procedure as is provided in section 2242.

Sec. 18. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§6, 2nd and 3rd ¶¶, as last amended by PL 1981, c. 475, §6, are further amended to read:

Only a duly licensed physician, registered nurse, registered physician assistant or a person certified by the Department of Human Services under certification standards to be set by that department, acting at the request of a law enforcement officer, may draw a specimen of blood for the purpose of determining the blood-alcohol level of a person who has not revoked his implied consent is complying with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test and who has selected a blood test. This limitation shall not apply to the taking of breath specimens.

1 A law enforcement officer may take a sample specimen of the 2 breath of any person whom he has probable cause to believe 3 has operated or attempted to operate a motor vehicle while 4 under the influence of intoxicating liquor and who has not 5 revoked his implied consent is complying with the duty to 6 submit to a blood-alcohol test and who has selected a breath 7 test, the sample specimen to be submitted to the Department 8 of Human Services or a person certified by the Department of 9 Human Services for the purpose of conducting chemical tests 10 of the sample specimen to determine the blood-alcohol level 11 thereof.

- 12 Sec. 19. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§6, 5th ¶, as repealed and 13 replaced by PL 1981, c. 458, §1, is amended by adding after 14 the first sentence a new sentence to read:
- The law enforcement officer shall require the person to submit to 2 or more testing procedures to constitute a completed test.
- 18 Sec. 20. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§8, 5th ¶, as last amended 19 by PL 1981, c. 475, §8, is further amended to read:

20 The revocation of a person's implied consent to a chemical test by refusing to allow the taking of a sample specimen as 21 authorized failure of a person to comply with the duty re-22 23 quired by this section to submit to a blood-alcohol test 24 shall be admissible in evidence on the issue of whether that person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor. 25 26 the law enforcement officer having probable cause to believe that the person operated or attempted to operate a motor 27 vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor fails 28 give either of the warnings required under subsection 1, the 29 revocation of the person's implied consent by refusing to submit to a chemical failure of the person to comply with 30 31 the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test shall not be 32 33 1f a revocation of consent failure admissible. to submit a blood-alcohol test is not admitted into evidence, the 34 35 court may inform the jury of the fact that no test result is 36 available.

- 37 Sec. 21. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§8, 6th ¶, as enacted by 38 PL 1979, c. 701, §33, is amended to read:
- If a test result is not available for a reason other than revocation of consent failing to comply with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test, the unavailability and the reason shall be admissible in evidence.
- 43 Sec. 22. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§8-A, as enacted by PL 44 1981, c. 468, §7-A, is amended to read:

8-A. Statements by accused. Any statement by a defendant that he was the operator of a motor vehicle, which he is accused of operating in violation of this former subsection 10, section 1312-B or section 1312-C, proceeding under this shall be admissible in а former subsection 10, section 1311 or 1312-B or 1312-C, if it was made voluntarily and is otherwise admissible under the United States Constitution or the Constitution of Maine. statement may constitutue sufficient proof by itself, without further proof of corpus deliciti, that the vehicle was operated and was operated by the defendant.

- 12 Sec. 23. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§11, ¶¶ A and B, as 13 amended by PL 1981, c. 475, §9, are further amended to read:
 - A. After a person has been charged with a violation of this section operating or attempting to operate a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs or with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10% or more, the investigating or arresting officer shall investigate to determine whether the charged person has any prior convictions under this section former subsection 10 or section 1312-B or an adjudication under section 1312-C. As part of his investigation, the officer shall make the necessary inquiries of the Secretary of State.
 - B. Any A law enforcement officer authorized to arrest for violations of this section may arrest, without a warrant, any person the officer has probable cause to believe has violated this section operated or attempted to operate a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs if the arrest occurs within a period following the offense reasonably likely to result in the obtaining of probative evidence of blood-alcohol level.
 - Sec. 24. 29 MRSA §1312, sub-§11, ¶C, as enacted by PL 1977, c. 626, §3, is amended to read:
 - C. Every If a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds, amounting to an articulable suspicion although not constituting probable cause, that a person operating has operated a motor vehicle which has been involved in an accident or which is operated in violation of any of the provisions of this Title shall, at the request of a police officer, in violation of sections 1312-B, 1314 or 2501-A, he may require that person to submit to a preliminary breath test to be administered by the police officer designed to determine

whether a person has been consuming alcohol. If the preliminary breath test indicates that the operator has consumed alcohol, the police law enforcement officer may require the operator to submit to a chemical test designed to determine the blood-alcohol level in the manner set forth in this section.

Sec. 25. 29 MRSA §1312-B, sub-§1-A is enacted to read:

- 1-A. Pleading and proof. The alternatives defined in subsection 1, paragraphs A and B may be pleaded in the alternative. The State may, but shall not be required to, elect prior to submission of the factfinder.
- 12 Sec. 26. 29 MRSA §1312-B, sub-§2, ¶C, as enacted by PL 13 1981, c. 468, §10, is amended to read:
 - C. Upon conviction, the court shall suspend the defendant's privilege license or permit to operate, right to operate a motor vehicle and right to apply for or obtain a license for a specified period, which shall not be less than of 90 days nor more than one year. The minimum period of suspension shall not be suspended by the court. The court shall give notice of the suspension and take physical custody of an operator's license as provided in section 2241-H. The Secretary of State may impose an additional period of suspension as provided in section 1312-D, subsection 1-A.
 - Sec. 27. 29 MRSA \$1312-B, sub-\$\$3 and 4 are enacted to read:
 - 3. Sentencing procedure. In determining the appropriate sentence, the court shall consider the record of convictions for criminal traffic offenses and adjudications of traffic infractions of the defendant. The court may rely upon oral representations based on records maintained by the courts, by the State Bureau of Identification or by the Secretary of State, including telecommunications of records maintained by the Secretary of State. If the defendant disputes the accuracy of any representation concerning a conviction or adjudication the court shall grant a continuance for the purposes of determining the accuracy of the record.
 - 4. Juvenile crime. References in this Title to this section shall be deemed also to refer to the juvenile crime stated in Title 15, section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F, and to the disposition, including a suspension, for that juvenile crime as provided in Title 15, section 3314, subsection 3, except as otherwise provided or except where the context clearly requires otherwise.

Sec. 28. 29 MRSA §1312-C, sub-§2-A is enacted to read:

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- 2 2-A. Pleading and proof. The alternatives defined in subsection 2, paragraphs A and B may be pleaded in the alternative. The State may, but shall not be required to, elect prior to submission to the factfinder.
- Sec. 29. 29 MRSA §1312-C, sub-§4, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §11, is repealed and the following enacted in 8 its place:
 - 4. Suspension. The license or permit to operate, right to operate a motor vehicle or right to apply for or obtain a license of any person adjudicated guilty of violating subsection 2 shall be suspended by the court for a period of 45 days. The period of suspension shall not be suspended by the court. The court shall give notice of the suspension and shall take physical custody of an operator's license or permit as provided in section 2241-H. The Secretary of State may impose an additional period of suspension, as provided in section 1312-D, and may extend any period of suspension until satisfaction of any conditions imposed by him pursuant to section 1312-D, subsection 3.
- 21 Sec. 30. 29 MRSA §1312-C, sub-§5, ¶¶ A, B and C, as 22 enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §11, are amended to read:
- \underline{A} . Was tested as having a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.20% or more;
 - B. Was driving more than 30 miles an hour in excess of the speed limit by 30 miles an hour or more during the operation which resulted in the prosecution for operating under the influence or with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10% or more;
- 30 <u>C. Attempted Eluded or attempted</u> to elude an officer, 31 as defined in section 2501-A, subsection 3, during the 32 operation which resulted in the prosecution for oper-33 ating under the influence or with a blood-alcohol level 34 of 0.10% or more; or
- 35 Sec. 31. 29 MRSA §1312-C, sub-§7, ¶B, as enacted by PL 36 1981, c. 468, §11, is amended to read:
- B. Had revoked his implied consent failed to comply with the duty to submit to take a blood or breath test by refusing to take one within immediately preceding 6 years immediately preceding the operation which resulted in the prosecution for operating under the

1 <u>influence or with a blood-alcohol level of 0.10% or</u> 2 more.

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28 29 30 Sec. 32. 29 MRSA §1312-D, sub-§1, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §12, is amended to read:

1. Recording and notice by Secretary of State. On receipt of an attested copy of the court record of a suspension or revocation of the privilege of operating a person's license, right to operate a motor vehicle or right to apply for or obtain a license or of a conviction or adjudication under section 1312-B or 1312-C, the Secretary of State shall immediately record the suspension of the person's license or permit and privilege to operate a motor vehicle and shall send written notice of the suspension of the court to If the court fails to suspend the liperson suspended. cense, right to operate a motor vehicle, or right to for or obtain a license of any person convicted under section 1312-B or adjudicated as having violated section 1312-C, or the juvenile crime defined by Title 15, section 3103, subsection 1, paragraph F, the Secretary of State shall suspend those rights for the periods specified in sections 1312-B, 1312-C and Title 15, section 3314, subsection 3, respectively, and shall send written notice of the pension as provided in this subsection.

Sec. 33. 29 MRSA §1312-D, sub-§1-A is enacted to read:

1-A. Additional suspension. The Secretary of State may suspend the license, the right to operate a motor vehicle or the right to apply for or obtain a license of any person adjudicated of having violated section 1312-C for an additional period of up to 135 days beyond the 45-day period of suspension required under section 1312-C, subsection 4.

31 The Secretary of State may suspend the license, the right to operate or the right to apply for or obtain a license of any 32 person, including a juvenile, convicted under section 1312-B 33 for an additional period of up to 275 days beyond the 90 34 days required under section 1312-B, subsection 2, paragraph 35 C, or up to 185 days beyond the 180 days required under 36 Title 15, section 3314, subsection 3, and if the person has been previously convicted or adjudicated under the former 37 38 section 1312, subsection 10 or section 1312-B or section 39 1312-C, the Secretary of State shall impose a further sus-40 41 pension of not less than 90 days.

Notice of any additional suspension pursuant to this subsection shall be given as provided in subsection 1.

Sec. 34. 29 MRSA §1312-D, sub-§§2 and 3, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §12, are amended to read:

- 2. Education and treatment programs. Following the expiration of 2/3 of the total period of suspension ordered by the court under imposed pursuant to subsection 1 and 1-A, section 1312-B, subsection 2, paragraph C, or section 1312-C, subsection 4, or Title 15, section 3314, the Secretary of State may issue a license or permit to the person if he receives written notice that the person has satisfactorily completed the alcohol education program of the Department of Human Services or has satisfactorily completed an alcohol treatment or rehabilitation program approved or licensed by the department.
- 3. Restricted licenses. After certification under subsection 2 or after completion of the suspension imposed by the court pursuant to this section and section 1312-B, 1312-C or Title 15, section 3314, the Secretary of State may issue the license or permit with whatever conditions, restrictions or terms he deems advisable, having in mind the safety of the public and the welfare of the petitioner, including, but not limited to, successful completion of the alcohol education program of the Department of Human Services, if the petitioner has not already done so under subsection 2. The license or permit may contain the condition that the person abstain from the use of intoxicating liquor or drugs.
- Sec. 35. 29 MRSA §1312-D, sub-§5, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §12, is amended to read:
- 5. Restricted licenses for suspension for failure to comply with duty to submit to blood-alcohol test. The Secretary of State may issue a restricted license or permit to any person whose license or permit has been suspended for a first revocation of implied consent by refusing failure to comply with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test under section 1312, subsection 2, if the conditions of issuing after issuance following a conviction or adjudication under section 1312-B or 1312-C are met by the person and a period of suspension of not less than 90 days has elapsed.
- 39 Sec. 36. 29 MRSA §1312-D, sub-§§7 and 8, as enacted by 40 PL 1981, c. 468, §12, are amended to read:
 - 7. Suspension in effect during appeal. If any person convicted or adjudicated of a violation of section 1312-B or 1312-C appeals the judgment or adjudication, the license or permit and privilege to operate a motor vehicle shall be

- suspended suspension imposed shall remain in effect during the time an appeal is pending, unless the court orders otherwise, or unless the Secretary of State restores the license, permit or privilege to operate pending decision on the appeal.
- 8. Consecutive suspensions. Any suspension under pursuant to this section or the former section 1312, subsection 10 or section 1312-B or 1312-C shall run consecutively with be consecutive to any suspension imposed under section 1312, subsection 2, for revocation of implied consent by refusing failing to comply with the duty to submit to a chemical test to determine blood-alcohol level by analysis of blood or breath.
- 14 Sec. 37. 29 MRSA §1314, sub-§2-A is enacted to read:
- 15 2-A. Statements by accused. The provisions of section 16 1312, subsection 8-A, shall apply to prosecutions under this 17 section.
- 18 Sec. 38. 29 MRSA §1314, sub-§3, as enacted by PL 1981, 19 c. 468, §13, is amended to read:

- 3. Penalties. Driving to endanger is a Class E crime. In addition, any person found guilty shall as part of the sentence receive a mandatory suspension of his license or permit to operate a motor vehicle, right to operate a motor vehicle or right to apply for or obtain a license for not less than 30 days nor more than 180 days, which minimum shall not be suspended. The court shall give notice of the suspension and take physical custody of an operator's license as provided in section 2241-H. If the court fails to impose a suspension as provided in this section, the Secretary of State shall impose the minimum period of suspension and may impose up to the maximum period of suspension and shall give notice as provided in section 1312-D, subsection 1.
- Sec. 39. 29 MRSA §2184, sub-§1, as repealed and replaced by PL 1981, c. 468, §14, is repealed and the following enacted in its place:
- 1. Offense; penalty. No person may operate a motor vehicle on any public highway of this State at a time when his license or permit to operate, his right to operate or his right to apply for or obtain a license or permit has been suspended or revoked, except for a revocation as an habitual offender under chapter 18-A or former chapter 18, when that person:

- A. Has received written notice of a suspension or 1 2 revocation pursuant to section 1312-D, subsection 1, 3 section 2241-H or other written notice from the Secre-4 tary of State;
- 5 B. Has actual knowledge of his suspension or revoca-6 tion:
- 7 C. Is a person whom written notice was sent by ordi-8 nary mail at the last known address shown 9 records maintained by the Secretary of State; or
- 10 D. Has failed to appear in court pursuant to any 11 notice or order specified in section 2301-A.
- Violation of this section is a Class D crime, provided that, 12 13 notwithstanding Title 17-A, section 1301, the maximum fine 14 shall be \$2,500.
- Sec. 40. 29 MRSA §2184, sub-§§1-A and 1-B are enacted 15 16 to read:
 - 1-A. Minimum mandatory sentences for certain suspensions. In the event the suspension was for a conviction for a violation of former section 1312, subsection 10 or section 1312-B or an adjudication for a violation of section 1312-C or for a failure to comply with the duty to submit blood-alcohol test under section 1312, subsection 2, the court shall impose a minimum fine of \$350, which minimum shall not be suspended; a term of imprisonment which shall be for not less than 7 consecutive days, which minimum shall not be suspended; and a mandatory suspension of license or permit or right to operate a motor vehicle, or right to apply for or obtain a license, for not less than one year nor more than 3 years consecutive to the original suspension, which minimum period shall not be suspended. The requirements of Title 15, section 757, of a separate reading of the allegation and a separate trial shall not apply to a proceeding under this subsection. The court shall give notice of the suspension and shall take physical custody of an operator's license or permit as provided in section 2241-H.
- 37 If the court fails to impose a suspension as provided this subsection, the Secretary of State shall impose the 38 minimum one-year suspension and may impose up to 3 years of 39 40 suspension and give notice as provided in section 1312-D, 41

subsection 1.

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The minimum mandatory sentences of this subsection shall apply only to the original period of suspension imposed by the court or by the Secretary of State, or as extended by the Secretary of State pursuant to section 1312-D, subsection 1-A. The minimum mandatory sentences of this subsection shall not apply to any extension of the original suspension, including an extension pursuant to section 1312-C, subsection 4, imposed for the purpose of compelling compliance with conditions for the restoration of a license or right to operate, or to an extension pursuant to section 2241-D for failure to pay a reinstatement fee.

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- 1-B. Statements by accused. The provisions of section 1312, subsection 8-A, shall apply in a prosecution pursuant to this section.
- 15 Sec. 41. 29 MRSA §2241-H, first and 2nd ¶¶, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §15, are amended to read:

the case of any conviction or adjudication under former section 1312, subsection 10, section 1312-B, 1312-C, 1314 or for any offense for which the suspension of a license or the right to operate a motor vehicle or the right to apply for or obtain a license is required by law or in any case in which the court suspends a license under section 2305, the court shall inform the defendant of the suspension and the defendant shall acknowledge this notice in writing on a form to be provided by the court. The court, as part of its sentence, notwithstanding any appeal unless defendant appeals and a stay of execution of the suspension is granted, shall take the any license certificate of issued by this State from the person convicted or adjudicated any license certificate issued by another state, foreign country or province from the person convicted or adjudicated if that person is residing, domiciled or employed in this State. The court, as part of its sentence, unless the defendant appeals and a stay of execution of the suspension is granted, may take from the person convicted or adjudicated any license certificate issued by another state foreign country or province if the person is not residing, domiciled or employed in this State. The court shall forward the license certificate, a copy of the sentence and the acknowledgment of notice by mail to the Secretary of State.

The court, upon reasonable cause shown, may allow the \underline{a} convicted or adjudicated person, who does not have the license certificate in his possession at the time of sentencing, up to 96 hours to surrender his license certificate.

Sec. 42. 29 MRSA §2241-1, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §15-A, is amended to read:

1	§2241-I.	Surrender	of	suspended	license	to	law	enforcement
2		officer						

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12 13 In the event that a law enforcement officer, in the course of stopping or detaining a motor vehicle, obtains from the operator of the motor vehicle a State of Maine license which or a license issued by another state, foreign country or province when, according to records of the Secretary of State which are available by telecommunications, that person's license or right to operate in this State is under suspension or revocation, the officer shall retain physical custody of the license and shall transmit the license, together with a report stating the circumstances under which it was obtained, to the Secretary of State.

- 14 Sec. 43. 29 MRSA §2292, sub-§1, ¶E, as enacted by PL 15 1979, c. 10, §2, is amended to read:
- 16 <u>E. Wilfully operating Operating</u> a motor vehicle with-17 out a license to do so;
- 18 Sec. 44. 29 MRSA \$2292, sub-\$1, \$1H and I, as enacted by PL 1979, c. 10, \$2, are amended to read:
- 20 <u>H.</u> Failure of the driver of a motor vehicle involved 21 in an accident resulting in the death or injury of any 22 person to stop close to the scene of the accident and 23 report his identity; or
- 24 <u>I.</u> Failure of the driver of a motor vehicle involved 25 in an accident resulting only in damage to an attended 26 or unattended vehicle or other property to stop close 27 to the scene of the accident and report his identity or 28 otherwise report the accident—;
- 29 Sec. 45. 29 MRSA §2292, sub-§1, ¶¶J and K are enacted 30 to read:
- 31 J. Eluding an officer, as defined by section 2501-A, subsection 3; or
- K. Passing a roadblock, as defined by section 2501-A,
 subsection 4.
- 35 **Sec. 46. 29 MRSA §2296,** as last amended by PL 1981, c. 36 475, §10, is further amended to read:
- 37 §2296. Relief from habitual offender status

At the expiration of one year from the date of the revocation under this chapter, or by the Superior Court under former chapter 18, a person whose license or right motor vehicle has been revoked may petition the Secretary of State for relief from his habitual offender Petitions for relief shall be presented to the Secretary of State, including petitions brought by persons whose revocation was by the Superior Court under former chapter 18. No petition for relief by a person revoked under former chapter 18 may be presented to the Superior Court. Upon petition, the Secretary of State in his discreafter determining that the public safety will not be endangered, may relieve the person from his status habitual offender, and, subject to the other provisions of law relating to the issuance of operators' license licenses, permits and privileges to operate, including the financial responsibility requirements of section 782, may issue the person the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State upon such terms and conditions as he may prescribe.

The Secretary of State shall not issue the privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State to any person whose license or privilege to operate has been revoked if a charge against that person under section 2298 is pending. If the Secretary of State subsequently determines that a license or privilege to operate was issued to a person against whom a charge under section 2298 was pending, he shall, without hearing, immediately reinstate the revocation of the license or privilege to operate and shall provide notice of the reinstatement of revocation.

Subject to the longer extension of the habitual offender status required under section 2298, no license or privilege to operate a motor vehicle in this State may be issued to a person who has been convicted of a violation of section 2298 for a period of at least one year following the conviction. If the person's license or privilege to operate has been restored during pendency of the prosecution under section 2298 or following conviction, the Secretary of State shall immediately reinstate the revocation, without hearing, of the license or privilege to operate and provide notice thereof. The reinstatement of revocation shall continue for a period of at least one year following the conviction.

Sec. 47. 29 MRSA §2298, 2nd ¶, first sentence, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §18, is amended to read:

If the person is defined as a <u>an</u> habitual offender under section 2292, subsection 1, <u>and one or more of the</u> convictions or adjudications defining him as an habitual

- offender is pursuant to section 2292, subsection 1, paragraph B, the following mandatory minimum penalties, which shall not be suspended, shall be imposed: A minimum fine of not less than \$1,000 \$500 and a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 60 days.
- Sec. 48. 29 MRSA §2298, 2nd ¶, as enacted by PL 1981, c. 468, §18, is further amended by adding after the first sentence a new sentence to read:
- The requirements of Title 15, section 757, of separate reading of the allegation and a separate trial shall not apply to sentencing pursuant to this provision.
- 12 Sec. 49. 29 MRSA §2300, sub-§3-A is enacted to read:
- 3-A. Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint as summons. A Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint, when served upon a person by a law enforcement officer, shall act as a summons to appear in court, on the date specified in the ticket, for a violation of any provision of this Title.
- 18 Sec. 50. 29 MRSA §2301-A, first ¶, as last amended by 19 PL 1979, c. 573, §3, is further amended to read:
- If a person fails to appear in court on the day specified in response to a <u>Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint</u>, 20 21 a summons, a condition of bail or order of court for any 22 violation of any provision of this Title, or in response to 23 24 a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint or for any further appearance <u>ordered</u> by the court, including one for the payment of a fine, either in person or by counsel, the court 25 26 27 may shall suspend his license or suspend permit, his right to operate motor vehicles in this State and the right to 28 29 apply for or obtain a license. The effective date of the suspension shall be governed by section 2241-E. 30
- 31 Sec. 51. 29 MRSA §2301-A, 2nd ¶, as last amended by PL 32 1979, c. 573, §3, is repealed.
- 33 Sec. 52. 29 MRSA §2302, 2nd sentence, as enacted by PL 34 1975, c. 430, §55, is amended to read:
- The District Court shall have original and concurrent jurisdiction with the Superior Court over all prosecutions for any other violations of this Title, except Class C or greater crimes, in which case, District Court jurisdiction
- 39 shall be subject to Title 4, section 152.
- 40 Sec. 53. 29 MRSA §2306, as amended by PL 1981, c. 468, 41 §21, is further amended to read:

§2306. Execution of suspension stayed during appeal

If any a person adjudicated to have committed a traffic infraction, except for a violation of section 1312-C, shall appeal appeals from the judgment and sentence adjudication of the trial court, the execution of any suspension imposed on of his license or right to operate a motor vehicle shall be stayed until adjudication disposition on appeal or withdrawal of the appeal, unless good cause is shown why he should not be allowed to retain his license and or right to operate. A stay of execution of any suspension imposed pursuant to section 1312-C shall be governed by section 1312-D.

Emergency clause. In view of the emergency cited in the preamble, this Act shall take effect when approved.

STATEMENT OF FACT

Section 1, in conjunction with sections 27, 40 and 48, states those occasions when the relatively cumbersome procedure of a bifurcated trial is necessary for the purpose of proving that a person has been previously convicted of a prior identical or similar offense, including operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol. These provisions restrict that cumbersome procedure only to those occasions when it is truly necessary.

Sections 2 through 5 make clear that the Juvenile Court has jurisdiction only over criminal operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol charges.

Sections 6 and 7 retain the policy, enacted last year, that informal adjustment may not be used in cases of OUI-EBA, but also eliminate the entire intake process, which served no remaining purpose and only caused delays.

Section 8 makes clear that the juvenile code imposes no limitation on the Secretary of State's authority to suspend not only in OUI-EBA cases, but in all Title 29 cases. It also makes clear that suspension may be imposed as to 3 separate "rights." This change is important for purposes of conformity and is discussed further under section 15.

Section 9 sets forth the Juvenile Court's sentencing power for violations of the juvenile crime of criminal OUI-EBA. There is no mandatory fine or mandatory jail term, although both may be imposed. A juvenile, however, will be suspended for 180 days rather than the 90 days for an adult.

1 Sections 10 and 11 facilitate the entry into evidence 2 of records of the Secretary of State.

Section 12 makes no substantive change in the law. However, it introduces to the statute an important concept stated in <u>State v. Plante</u>, Me., 417 A.2d 991 (1980): That "implied consent" in fact describes a duty by the citizen who is driving to submit to a test if there is probable cause and that there is no "right" to refuse. This important conceptual change is made throughout the statute. (See sections 13-20, 31)

11 Section 13 makes a language change purely for purposes 12 of clarity.

Section 14. See section 12.

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14 Section 15. See section 12. This section also makes 15 clear that upon a suspension, the Secretary of State may 16 impose any or all of the following suspensions: (1) Maine operator's license; (2) the right to operate, that is, the right of an out-of-state driver who has an out-17 18 19 of-state license to operate in the State; and (3) the right any person to apply for and, if successful, obtain a li-20 21 cense. The various provisions in Title 29 concerning sus-22 pension were extremely inconsistent in their reference as to 23 what was subject to suspension. The purpose here is both to 24 clarify and to make these provisions consistent with each other. (See also sections 8, 9, 14, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 50) A final change in this section clarifies the 25 26 27 Secretary of State's duty concerning suspension where delay in sending in the failure to comply has occurred. 28

Section 16. See section 12. Section 16 also makes clear that the license suspension for failure to comply with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test applies in the case of attempted operation as well as actual operation, thus fixing what is clearly an oversight in the present law.

34 Section 17. See section 15.

Section 18. See section 12

Section 19 is designed to ensure more reliable test results with self-contained breath testing apparatuses.

38 Section 20-21. See section 12.

39 Section 22 makes clear that the rule enacted by this 40 section last year applies to all prosecutions for operating

under the influence or with excessive blood alcohol, not just those under section 1312-B.

 Section 23, in paragraph A, makes clear that an investigating officer must attempt to find a prior record of OUI-EBA whenever the person has a new charge. In paragraph B the amendment makes clear that the power to arrest on probable cause applies to the general offense of OUI-EBA and not to violations of "this section," the definition of the crime having been removed from section 1312.

Section 24 states a more appropriate standard than that stated in the present provision for requiring a person to take a "screening test." It also makes clear that the test required under this section is in fact only a screening test and not the blood-alcohol test described previously in section 1312.

Section 25 makes clear that operating under the influence and operating with a blood-alcohol level in excess of 0.10% may be pleaded and proved alternatively, that both alternatives may be submitted to the jury but that the jury need not be confused by 2 alternatives if the prosecution believes that its evidence is such that it desires to rely on only one.

Section 26. See section 15. Since few courts seemed to be exercising the discretion under the original provision to suspend for a period between '90 days and a year, this power is returned to the Secretary of State, where it may be applied uniformly. See section 33. In the 2nd amendment, reference is made to Title 29, section 2241-H in order to assure that procedures mandated there are followed under this section.

Section 27 makes clear the procedures to be followed at sentencing under Title 29, section 1312-B. Section 27 also makes clear that provisions in this Title relating to prosecutions, convictions and suspensions under section 1312-B apply to juvenile prosecutions for criminal OUI-EBA as well.

Section 28. See section 25.

Section 29. See section 26. This section also adds the provision, omitted by oversight, that the suspension of a license or right to operate or apply may not be suspended by the court.

41 Section 30. Paragraph A makes clear that the 42 blood-alcohol level which, if present, requires criminal

prosecution is 0.20% or more and not more than 0.20%, that is, 0.21%. This change makes this provision consistent with those which define the crime and the civil violations themselves, 0.10% or more. Paragraph B makes a similar change 4 as to exceeding the speed limit by 30 mph or more. 5 6 second amendment in this paragraph makes the description of 7 operating under the influence or with 8 blood-alcohol offense accurate. Paragraph referred crime to "eluding." The crime itself is defined as 9 10 including an attempt. It also changes the description operating under the influence 11 or with 12 blood-alcohol offense.

Section 31. See section 12. The second amendment clarifies what 6-year period is being referred to.

Section 32. See section 15. The second amendment recognizes the fact that courts may and in fact have, through oversight, neglected to enter suspensions. This provision provides that in such an event the Secretary of State shall order the suspension.

Section 33. As explained under section 26, see also section 29, the power to impose suspensions beyond the basic minimums of 45 days (civil) and 90 days (criminal) is transferred to the Secretary of State. This section implements that transfer. The basic total suspension periods, criminal, one year, civil, 180 days, remain the same. In the case of a second operating under the influence or excessive blood-alcohol conviction or adjudication, the Secretary of State must suspend for an additional 90 days. Section 33 also gives the Secretary of State the same power to impose an additional period of suspension upon juveniles as upon adults, for a total period not to exceed a year.

32 Section 34. The changes in this section merely conform 33 these provisions to take account of the changes in sections 34 26, 29 and 33.

Section 35. See section 12.

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Section 36. As to section 1312-D, subsection 7, see section 15 of this bill. In section 1312-D, subsection 8, the first amendment makes clear that consecutive suspension periods for a conviction or adjudication for operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol and for failing to comply with the duty to submit to a blood-alcohol test apply to all operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol convictions or adjudications, including those under the old law. See also section 12.

Section 37 extends the rule of section 1312, subsection 8-A, to prosecutions for driving to endanger.

Section 38. See section 15. The 2nd amendment makes reference to those provisions of section 2241-H, seizure of license, and section 1312-D, imposition of suspension by Secretary of State if court fails to do so.

39 substantially amends the crime of operating Section after suspension to make clear, for the first time, what required in the nature of notice to the person suspended or knowledge by the person suspended, or both. The present statute is completely silent on the matter and could be read strict liability, regardless of notice or knowl-However, judges have imposed a variety of different There has never been a case decided by the Law Court imposing a uniform standard. Title 29, section subsection 1, paragraphs A to D, state 4 different alternative requirements which will satisfy the notice or knowledge requirement. These provisions range from actual knowledge actual receipt of notice to those imposing liability if the defendant ought to have known of the suspension. A 2nd change eliminates the mandatory \$350 fine which, in last year's bill, was applied to violations of all suspensions, not just suspensions for operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol.

Section 40. For purposes of convenience and because of greater elaboration, the provisions concerning minimum mandatory sentences for operating after suspension, when the suspension is for operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol cases, are moved to a new subsection 1-A. No changes are made in the amounts of the penalties. The provision discussed under section 33 is applied to this section. The final paragraph makes clear that the minimum mandatory penalties apply only to the original suspension for the operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol cases and not to extensions of that period for failure to pay a reinstatement fee or failure to comply with other conditions of reinstatement. As to subsection 1-B, see section 37.

Section 41 clarifies several procedures under Title 29, section 2241-H. (1) It makes clear that the procedures apply to convictions under the old law. (2) It conforms the language of suspensions to that in section 12. (3) It makes clear that the seizure of a license is not required if a stay of execution is issued under section 1312-D, subsection 7, thus removing a conflict with that provision. (4) It clarifies when the court must and when the court may

seize an out-of-state license. (5) The last paragraph is amended to give the only valid reason for the court to allow 96 hours to surrender a license.

Section 42 makes clear that a law enforcement officer must seize any license, Maine or out-of-state, if the person's license or right to operate in the State is suspended.

Section 43 conforms the description of this crime, in the list of those offenses which will give rise to habitual offender status, to the actual definition of the crime, there being no "wilfull" requirement for operating a motor vehicle without a license.

13 Section 44 makes punctuation changes in implementation 14 of section 45.

Section 45 adds these 2 serious crimes to the list of habitual offender offenses.

Section 46 makes clear that all petitions for reinstatement of the privilege to operate must be presented to the Secretary of State, including habitual offender revocations imposed by the Superior Court under the old law. The amendment to the 2nd paragraph closes a loophole. Last year's amendment made clear that if a person had driven in violation of the revocation, he may not obtain a license while the criminal proceeding charging the violation of that revocation was pending. The amendment makes clear that if the privilege of operating is mistakenly restored, it must be revoked again. The 3rd paragraph imposes a minimum one-year extension of any revocation if the person has been convicted of driving in violation of the revocation.

Sections 47 and 48 reinstate language which was intended to be included last year and which was approved by the Judiciary Committee. In its absence, an ambiguity was created as to the number of operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol convications required, as part of the 3 convictions necessary for habitual offender status, to invoke rise to the mandatory sentencing provisions. As to the new last sentence, see section 1. Section 47 also changes the minimum mandatory fine from \$1,000 to \$500.

Section 49 corrects an omission. Other provisions in this section provide that a Uniform Traffic Ticket and Complaint serves as a complaint. This amendment provides that it acts as a summons.

Section 50. The first changes are for purposes of clarity and consistency. See also section 15. The last sentence is designed to make sure there is an adequate period of time to provide notice of the suspension.

Section 51. The second paragraph of this subsection is repealed because it is redundant with the first paragraph.

Section 52 makes clear that the District Court has no authority to try a person for a Class C crime.

Section 53 makes appropriate changes in wording without substantive effect. The last sentence makes clear that the one traffic infraction of operating under the influence or with excessive blood-alcohol cases, under section 1312-C, is governed by section 1312-D rather than this section.